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On January 20. 1969* a U« 8. Havy court of inquiry
was convened at Coronado* California* to determine tha
facta* circumatancee and raeponsibiXity for tha aaisuro of
tha intelligence ship* iffft fcysfcdQ* which had occurred one
year earlier in the Sea of Japan off the coast of north
Korea. The Pueblo incident* a major news atory for almost
all of 1968. had reached a final and crucial stage.
The return of the Pueblo's cram to the United
Statee on December 24* 1968* attracted some 450 journalista
and camera crewmen from around the world to the Bevy's
largest homeport* San Diego. By the time the court began
ita dally hearings* the number had dropped to about 30
journalists and 20 television newsmen* and a corresponding
number of technical personnel. In addition to two local
newspaper reporters and two local television newsmen* the
media members represented eight nationally known newspapers,
four major wire services* the three major television
networks* two news magazines and five popular and business
," > , wf I»ool cms &•» *
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publications.
In order to evaluate the reporterial performance of
the press correspondents at the court of inquiry it is
important to review the atmosphere in which they operated
and the facilities they had at their disposal to report the
story.
Information Bureau
Wavy established a command information bureau
(CIB) to handle the public affairs aspects and dissemina-
tion of information about the crew's return and the
subsequent inquiry to the media and public. It began
operation officially on December 22, 1968.
Planning for the CIB began immediately after the
seisure of the Pueblo by the north Koreans, following
established Mavy doctrine, the operation plan covering the
procedures for the bureau anticipated every situation
public affairs specialists could project with regard to the
needs and demands of the media representatives who would be
present to report the story. » workable operations plan
was prepared and distributed to vitally concerned Haval
Collected Piles of the UIB Pueblo Command
Information Bureau (Operational Documents Section in
Department of Naval History* Washington* D. C.
)
» Press
Accreditation Log and Court Entry Logs. Entries appear by
correspondent name* affiliation and date.
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long before the actual release of the Pueblo
crew.
The aiesion of tha Pueblo CIB was twofold. The
firat responsibility was to advise tha coaaiand responsible
for tha disposition of tha Pueblo craw and the conduct of
tha inquiry in all public affairs matters. The second
reaponaibility was to the nawa media and ia beat expreaaed
in the mission statement of the operations plant
. • . to establish a central point for an orderly flow
of information to working praaa ... to give media
repreaentativea direct and immediate aaeiatanee when-
ever possible ao that they might report the subject
with the graateat possible understanding of the facta. 3
TO implement this mission the Navy temporarily
ordered public affaira specialists and enlisted journalists
from major Maval commanda on the West coast to fill the
positions at tha bureau. In all soma 50 personnel* each
selected by professional reputation, reported for temporary
duty until the court was completed.
In charge of the CIB was Captain Vincent C. Thomaa.
Jr.. than public affaire officer for the Commander-in-Chief
Report on Planning For Physical Facilitiea and
Personnel For the US6 Pueblo Command Information Bureau
(Pueblo Pilea in Public Affaire Office of Commander Maval
WLr Forces. Pacific Fleet, worth laland Maval Air Station,
San Diego, California), report of Lt. Cmdr. William Colline,
February 25, 1969. Hereafter cited as Pueblo Report.
^Operations Plan 99, Breeches Buoy (Classified doc-
ument of Commander Maval Air Forcea, Pacific Fleet, North
laland Maval Air Station, San Diego, California), Annex V,
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4of the Pacific Fleet. Personally acquainted with many of
the media representatives to the court* Captain Thomas had
been a newspaperman in Louisville, Kentucky, and had served
as public affairs officer for several major Naval
commanders, among them the Chief of Maval Operations on two
occasions*
Media representatives arriving in San Diego to
cover the crsw*s return presented their credentials to the
CXB and were issued pammmm to the U. S. Maval Hospital
where the bureau was located and Where the crew would be
housed upon arrival.
Immediately available to the media at the bureau
were numerous background information releases prepared by
the CXB. These included copies of previous releases of
information pertinent to the Pueblo incident made hy all
federal agencies and periodic progress reports on the
crew's trip from South Korea.
Separate facilities were provided at the bureau to
meet the particular needs of print and broadcast media. *
photo section pooled Mavy and civilian photographic efforts
to cover the crew's arrival. Communication equipment was
installed before the bureau began operation and included
Western Union and wire service terminals, pay and contract
telephones, and all major news wires. Typewriters, office
equipment, refreshment machines, television receivers,
sod conference areas were also available at the
cjw* no • - ti: ' IPP
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preee facility which operated seven days a week* 24 hours a
day. 4
Prior to his arrival at San Di«*jo, each Pueblo
crwaan was given a public affairs procedures briefing.
Thus* with regard to his experiences on the Pueblo during
captivity* each was advised not to discuss with the public
or media anything of a classified nature* nor anything
which in his opinion might jeopardise the objective gather*
ing of facts in the forthcoming inquiry. Host important to
Navy officials was that the crewmen's exact remembrance of
every possible detail of the previous 11 months not be
disturbed by reiteration to family* friends or the media.
These memories also became the content of classi-
fied intelligence debriefings that filled 270 miles of
recording tape during the first three weeks of the crew's
stay st the Maval Hospital in San Diego. This information*
restricted to the intelligence community* was vitally
5
tsportant and never became evidence in the inquiry,
because it was considered "privileged information" in a
sense* and might have been incriminating to some of the men.
The stringent security measures enforced by the
Savy tm^mx permitted the media to come into direct contact
Pueblo Report* lac., fiil*
SCaptain C. Dale Everhart* 0. 8. Savy* cited by
Trevor Armbrister in & Hatter at ftCCQUJitAbility. Xhrn Xout
stftry aX fcfca fr**iaift ft*f»ir (sew York* Coward-McCann* Inc..
1970) * p. 348.
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Iwith Pueblo crewmen during their etey at the hospital
except at formal press conferences which were conducted
infrequently* Pueblo's commanding officer* Commander
Lloyd M. Bueher. spoke briefly to the huge crowd assembled
to meet the crew at Miramar saval Air Station on
December 24. 1968* His mental and physical exhaustion was
apparent and was the reason for a medical decision not to
permit him to appear before the media during medical
processing and intelligence debriefInge prior to the
inquiry. In his steed, the Pueblo's executive officer
•••ducted a brief press conference shortly after the crew
reached the hospital. Lieutenant Sdward R. Murphy,
commenting only on his role as ship's navigator* described
how he introduced impossible ship positions into falsified
charts his captors forced him to prepare in order to render
ridiculous their "proof that the ship had entered North
Korean territorial waters. He also avoided some questions
which the Savy thought probed into areas better left to the
court of inquiry.
Xjjut understated the security situation, which
disturbed some correspondents* when it reported* "The Mavy
was saving the Pueblo's story for the court ... and it
ordered the crew to say nothing."
Armed forces* "Heroes or Survivors?*" Xittm*
January 10* 1969* p. 19.
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7Bucher's pro-San Diego comments to the
press about the crew's brutal treatment at the hands of the
north Koreans appeared in almost every media report during
the days before the court. Medical examinations of the
crew at San Diego shocked even the hardened military
physicians as countless bruises and sears from severe
beatings were discovered. Clark Clifford* then Secretary
of Defense* ordered an immediate investigation of the
beatings While the CIS photo lab documented on film the
evidence of mistreatment of the Pueblo men. To further
illustrate their torture while in captivity* the Mavy per*
mitted two crewmen to appear before the media to describe
their experiences in North Korea. Pueblo CZB officials
selected Quartermaster First Class Charles S. Law and
Radioman Second Class Lee Roy Hayes to meet the press on
the basis of several criteria. Their mistreatment was
Indicative of the severe punishment the entire crew
suffered, each in his own way was well-spoken and seemed
able to handle the searching questions of the correspond-
ents. Finally* the health of the two men was sufficient to
withstand the nervous strain of an appearance before the
media.
The media soon adjusted to the fact that they could
not personally interview Pueblo personnel other than during
the few controlled press conferences already mentioned,
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speculating about major issues and questions with Which the
court would have to coal.
Tho Code of Conduct for U. ft. servicemen received
the greatest press attention. Its applicability to the
Pueblo situation was a matter of controversy for both the
military and the press. The CXB attempted to clarify the
issues for correspondents at the hospital by calling San
Cisco based Havy legal experts into several press confer-
ences to answer their questions. Captain Gale &• Krouse
that* "Failure to observe the guidelines of this
(code) is not in my mind a criminal offense." TlmH
reported that the Defense Department insisted the code was
s
militarily binding on the Pueblo crew while in captivity.
The dilemma for the court was that the code had never been
enforced and by ltsell carried no penalties for failure to
observe its provisions. Without any specific precedent the
court hsd no guidelines by which to svaluats the confes-
sions which the North Koreans extracted from the crew
7
"Code of Conduct for Members of the Armed forces
of the united States." Executive Order 10631* signed by
Dwight D. Sisenhower at The Unite Bouse. August 17, 1955*
contained in the Savy Department's General Order **o. 4
(Washington* D. C.i U. 8* Government Printing Office*
1956), document no. 0-421935.
aOpinion expressed by Captain Gals £. Krouse* JJM3C,
U8M* in a press conference at the U. S. Naval Hospital*
San Diego* December 31* 1969.
9
"The Dilemma of the Code* " XitfmV* January 3* 1969*
p. 19.
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during their captivity. 10
la a January 13 press conference, counsel far the
court. Captain William Newsome, announced that the Pueblo
crewmen were "illegal detainees" and not prisonera of war.
Therefore the provisions of the code did not apply to their
actions while in north Korea. To his dismay the Defense
Department midway through the court decided the Code did
apply to the Pueblo men.
The matter of the Code of Conduct was indicative of
the complex problems which confronted the press and chal-
lenged ita reporting ability. Similar situations occurred
frequently during the inquiry.
Congressional interest in the Pueblo affair was
understandably intense. Senator Richard Russell* then
chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, commentedt
These men are being hailed aa heroes. They are her<
in the sense that they survived the imprisonment. But
they did sign a great many statements that did not
reflect any great heroism in my mind. I'll have to
investigate further to see just what hero-type things
they performed. 11
Bis comments disagreed with the comments of several
high ranking llaval officers. Among them, admiral John J.
flyland, the Commander of the Pacific Fleet, who had ordered
the court of inquiry, deecribed the crew as heroes, and
Furthermore, the court received little or no
guidance from legal experts at Navy headquarters in
Washington, D. C.
ll
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Rear Admiral iidwin M. Rosenberg, in charge of the crew's
trip frost South Korea to the Onited status, referred to
12Commander Bucher as "... a hero naiona, heroes. m
On January 10 the Havy closed the hospital bureau
and relocated all press facilities at the site of the court,
the Naval Amphibious Base at Coronado, California* At the
saws tine, a 10-day delay in convening the inquiry was
announced as nodical authorities waited for Commander
Bucher *s health to improve sufficiently to withstand the
strain of the hearing.
During the delay the CIS concentrated on informing
the press of the administrative and legal procedures under
Which the Inquiry would be conducted. Captain Bewsome and
his associates stressed that the court of inquiry was not a
trial. Zt was an investigative proceeding, not unlike a
civilian grand jury. The Baval order appointing the court
required that it ascertain the facts and recommend appro-
priate administrative or disciplinary action. Zt could not
determine guilt or innocence or administer punishment. On
January 13, as Captain Hewsome and Commander William
Clemons, his assistant counsel, prepared to screen prospec-
tive witnesses, they Informed the press that the court
would divide its Inquiry into three phases • the ship's
i20pinion expressed by Rear Admiral Edwin M.
Rosenberg, U. 6. Savy, in a ^x^mm conference at Seoul,
South Korea* December 21, 1963.
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mission and operation, tha seisur** and the er«w # s deten-
tion period. Nrwaor** said ha planned a typical navy
investigation lasting from three weeks to a wonth. Be
predicted the length baaed on the court reeting six days a
week sad his doubts that all crew rentwra would have to
testify. Re explained Commander Bucher's position as a
party to the investigation* a routine declaration for the
commanding officer of any Navy vessel lost or damaged which
insures his right to be represented by counsel* to call
witnesses and present evidence in his own behalf* and to be
present at all hearings. The press was informed that some
court sessions would be closed to hear classified testimony ,
but that every a ffort would be made to declassify the
testimony so a witness could present it in open session.
nevertheless* on January 19 Bernard tfeinraub
reported in Xh* Its* XorJk XlsMiAt
• • • there has been some uneasiness that siseable
portions of the testimony were to be heard in closed
sessions, navy lawyers have insisted that closed
hearings would be held only because of the "sensitive**
and 'highly classified nature" of the ship's mission.
But there is some feeling that closed hearings could
also be used for testimony that would embarrass the
Bavy.
Three months after the court closed* one of the
correspondents analysed the probable effect the press had
on the formation of public opinion about the inquiry and








. • • the court . . • had been deluged with letters and
telegrams abusiny then for their "mistreatment* of . . .
Bueher ... Most of the blame for the emotional
reaction and indignation evolved from press reports of
the court's questioning of Bueher. h cooplex story
that required reporting by those familiar with military
terminology * laws* regulations* and traditions was
covered by a working press that for the most part was
militarily and in some esses unqualified
>* objective reporting. The results
misunderstanding* leading to a backlash
against the credibility of the press. 13
The correspondent* Kip Cooper* was the military
affaire editor for the &MA fiiagflt uni*m. and had previously
served 23 yeara in the Mavy* retiring as a Chief Journalist*
Mails it seems certain his opinion was flavored by his
background* nevertheless research into the writing of a
number of correspondents at the court revealed that some of
his criticisms had a basis in fact. Cooper* a criticisms
and the author* a preliminary research and presence at the
court as a participant-observer showed the need for a
careful study of press performance to determine the quality
of press coverage of this long and highly important story.
a press performance study of selected correspondents
to the court* including those with and without previous
military background* should permit one to draw some
interesting conclusions based upon a comparison of their
Kip Cooper* The Pueblo and the Press
<
(a P^ftiftT 1 y Hair lair se* itaUMHAStuLM Jay fiflpTi ay
June* 19*9* p. 12.
The author was assigned to the court as s tfavy
public affairs specialist for its entirety.
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Apart front danyixvg or confirming Cooper's
about his allegedly non-expert colleagues, the study
csa apply to the quastion of specialised reporting progress
in journalism education and the need for sore specialisa-
tion by reporters in the field*
Ho previous research has been conducted on the
Pueblo incident in the setter of press performance. How-
ever § a 1970 study of the formation of public opinion and
its affect on wavy policy did speak to the issue of news
coverage of the Pueblo story:
The capture of the OSS Pueblo . . . by north Korea, a
Casus b«iil in an earlier era, provoked internal
conflict rather than international confrontation.
Public sentiment, as refleeted in news accounts,
editorials, journals and congressional statements had a
significant effect on official ... Wavy behavior.
Apparent public hostility toward the Wavy was most
clearly manifest in the period following tha release of
the Pueblo crew, particularly during the Court of
Inquiry, and was probably the single most important
factor in determining ultimate disposition by the Navy.
The options available to the Wavy were circumscribed by
adverse public sentiment. 1$
Whether the public *s hostility was the *single most
important factor 1* in the Wavy*s disposition of the case is
s matter of some controversy But, there is little doubt
that press and television reports were the primary influ-
ences on the formation of public opinion. Establishing
some measure of the accuracy of press reports of the Pueblo
l5Williem *• Armbruster, "The Pueblo Crisis and
Public Opinion* (unpublished thesis* 0. S. Waval War
College, 1970), p. 132.
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Court of Inquiry is* therefore, useful.
This study will follow the general design of a 1965
University of Wisconsin Journalism Hester's thesis by
Tmomai Clesry. 16 In it he tested the hypothesis* "Did the
U. 8. Frees* in its coverage of the Korean Iter* accurately
portray the Korean situation to the U. S. Public . • .?"
To do so he coopered news reports from the battlefield
against the historical standard for his study* the official
U. S. Xrmy history of the Korean Mar. Be then pointed out
deviations from the standard and qualitatively analysed
them.
This study will test the following hypothesis!
Correspondents to the Pueblo Court of Inquiry accurately
reported the open court proceedings in news stories which
appeared in their parent or member publications*
Additionally* this study will answer the question*
"What was the difference* if any* between reports by
correspondents with military reporting experience and cor-
respondents with no previous experience?"
Accuracy is defined here as the truthful reproduc-
tion of dialog and events as these evolved during open
court sessions* £n inaccuracy is defined broadly as a flaw
'MMJmas J* Cleary* Jr.* "Reporting the Korean Wart
of the U. g. Press in the First Sixty Pays of
the Korean War" (unpublished Thesis* University of
Wisconsin* 1965)* p. 18.
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or error in the reproduction.
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This study demanded an uniaqpaachable standard
against which to compare correspondents* stories for accur-
acy of detail. The standard in this case was the verbatim
record of the open court proceedings* entitled as follows
a
aacacd ojt Frnnnnil trios of & Court of inauicy Cob%sium1 lay
ordftr at riwmiwin i JLa Chief* UoitsA &tj*ta* yacifie ciaot*
ta Inquire iota the. Clnrianstjnnim Relating to. the aavUurjft
of the USA sit^Kift fftqfift-i) by worth Korean KtseaX iflaftcee.
**h*«-fr Qcfturxed la the *e* fitf fll*pfflin on XI Jftiwj^y J^fe^ ajad
the Subsegaitnt Betnntlan of tha Yaaeei «a& the Officers and
smmmV
Also, the author was a Navy public affaire officer
at the court for ita entirety. First-hand knowledge of the
event provided insight to possible errors in news stories
which were then tested by going to the court record.
Contact with each of the correspondents to the court on a
William a. Blankeaburg* "Hews Accuracy* worn*
Findings On the Meaning Srrors" (paper for the Association
for Education in Journalism* Berkeley* California* August*
1969)* p. a.
The record of the open court proceedings is
unclassified and was made available to the author through
the courtesy of the Department of the Wavy* Judge Advocate
General, Assistant for Investigations* Bavy Annex*
Washington* D. C. Hereafter thie document will be cited as
ammWfc





regular basis gave the author an Insight into their
respective backgrounds as veil.
The length of the verbatim record* over 1800 pages*
and the length of news atories by selected correspondents
in a sample of newspapers immediately indicated that the
identification of every factual error* no natter its
significance to the important elementa of the court* was
impossible* Two days of testimony selected arbitrarily
were tested to see if errors could be categorised and
quantified according to 14 types of errors* ranging from
misspelling to misplaced emphasis* as derived by Fred C*
Berry* Jr.* and William Blanfcenburg* Objective errors
relating to wrong names * titles* military commands* or in
other words witness identification* were too few* with the
small number of correspondents* to yield meaningful data.
Subjective errors relating to misplaced emphasis* omission
of Important elements of testimony and procedure* and
reporter interpretation not supported logically by the
court dialog were found to be more significant* The same
general results were achieved by evaluating the first two-
thirds of all the court coverage by two of the correspond-
enta. In each case* however* the Quantity of errors did
19
Fred C. Berry* Jr.* **. study of Accuracy in Local
News Stories of Three Dailies. • Journal JBtt QuflftSXly*
44.492-490 (»utumn 1967)* Blankeaburg* loc* £*U»«* p. 14*
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not approximate the figures tabulated by Barry and
Blaakenburg*
This may b« due in part to tha methods by which
Barry and Blankenburg datarminad news atory errors*
Briefly* news etoriee were aalactad and nailed to persons
mentioned therein with a Questionnaire asking in general
what that newsmaker believed was wrong in the atory. This*
the authora reported* Might have accounted for some bias
and a high inaccuracy rate*
Several other factors were also thought to bear on
this finding* especially in the case of objective errors*
Repetition of naaea* places* dates* titles and so forth was
quite common* as with any continuing news story where aews~
makers constantly tmmpp—r 9 This permitted the correspond"
eats to correct their mistakes the next day. Also* much of
the testimony itself became repetitious in later stages of
proceedings* Moreover* there were only a finite number of
facts* events and witnesses* each considerably less in
number most probably* than in corresponding categories in
other newspaper accuracy surveys*
Perhaps the most important factor bearing on accur-
acy in this news event* however* was the most effective
process of feedback. The news copy of correspondents at





affairs personnel as a matter of course. Because of a
considerable rapport and mutual respect which developed
over the month they had been working on the Pueblo affair
before the court opened* CXB personnel and correspondents
could discuss with each other what were believed by each to
be confusing issues in the testimony* Often* patterns
appeared in queries submitted to the CXB press query section
which suggested that some element before the court was a
particular problem for most newsmen. In that event* formal
press conferences were scheduled quickly to air the problem.
Without exception the CXB sent two officers to record in
long-hand the significant portions of each day* a open and
closed testimony. These transcriptions were prepared aa
news releases at noon and SiOO p.m. after thorough editing
by the assigned court reporters. Pinally. the CXB made
available to the correspondanta the first rough drafts of
the verbatim record of open court proceedings approximately
36 hours after the fact* and tape recordings of all press
conferences almost immediately after each briefing
adjourned* to further insure the accuracy of reporting.
This study operationsliasd the definition of news
inaccuracy as a significant deviation from the verbatim
court record. Only news reports of open court proceedings*
at which correspondents could be present* were analysed to
determine errors in reporting.
Determining whether a news report's deviation from
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the court record was aiunificant wae a west difficult
problem. Generally, the author nade this determination
solely on his own judgment. However * judgment was aaaiated
by the author 'a remembrance of many errora which were noted
by court officiala * members of the public and especially by
the correapondenta at the court while the hearing* were
underway. Thus, aa Kip Cooper later wrote, and often
brought to the author 'a attention during the proceedings!
Scan of the atoriea filed on the Pueblo inquiry were ao
erratic they were posted on bulletin boards by an
anonymous sailor or perhapa a newsman. 21
Sven more important to the issue of significance of errors
was Cooper's observations
Sons of these /reporter*/ were not qualified for
unbiased* objective reporting of the daily court pro-
ceedings* This statement ie based on admissions by a
couple of such reporters that they had cone with pre-
convinced biases auaiast all Kavy "braes." They used
the proceedings to substantiate those biases* thus
misinforming the public about the court. 22
Almost without exception mention of an error in a
news report* by a correspondent or principal member of the
Mavy's staff* was made on the basis of its distortion of
important issues before the court or the apparent liveli-
hood that the error would mislead the public and promote
misunderstanding.
These experiences and a thorough reading of the
cooper*










open court record three tines have given the author en
insight into what errors would have adversely affected the
reader's full understanding of the court's activities.
Therefore* for the purposes of this study* a
significant error or deviation has been operationally
defined as one which, in the judgment of the author*
adversely affected a full understanding of the court
events* court procedures* and the testimony of witnesses.
Significant deviations in reporting were isolated
according to the following categories of errors Identifica-
tion of witness; attribution of testimony or court
officials* statements; omission of court procedure or
testimony essential to understanding of an event; mis-
quotations headline unsupported by court event or dialog;
over or under emphasis of court event or dialog; reporter
interpretation or analysis of proceedings unsupported by
court event or dialog. Those categories are comparable
with those isolated in the Berry and Blankehburg studies
and should permit replication.
The category of over or under emphasis was con-
sidered to be subject to considerable researcher bias. Two
methods were examined to reduce bias and improve replica-
tion. In the first method the researcher might evaluate
the lead of each news story against the findings* opinions
and recommendations finally reached by the court. Presuming
the integrity of the court* its final report should have
derived from the significant elements appearing in the
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testimony and from the weight of evidence presented, flews
not relating to the court's findings* opinions end
letions night then be considered suspect es regards
Unfortunately* the court made over 500 findings
of fact and rendered almost as many opinions. Furthermore*
much of the court's final report derived from testimony
taken in closed sessions from which correspondents were
excluded. * method suggested by William Blankenburg was
found to be more reliable in the attempt to discern mis-
placed emphasis. Beadlines and leads of selected corre-
spondents* stories were compared to each other to establish
conformity or agreement* in the correspondents* selection
of the most important court events or dialog for each day
of open court proceedings they covered. Deviation from the
majority view provided at least circumstantial evidence of
over or under emphasis.
The relatively small number of categories* the
manageable amount of writing and the general level of
professional excellence of the selected correspondents per-
mitted the author to conduct a qualitative analysis and to
make both negative and positive mention of press perform-
ance, the analysis chronologically followed the court
hearings in order to develop the complex themes present in
23Louis Gottschalk* UodeXaJLADdjUi* wi«*Q«»y (2d «d.j
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and testimony and to relate deviations to the
total context of tha court's activities. This method was
more meaningful to the author and permitted more flexible
explanations of performance than could be obtained by the
"atomistic combination of measureable units'* in the
quantitative method. 24
Correspondents selected for the study were chosen
on the basis of several criteria. The primary considera-
tion was their relatively continuous attendance at the
court from beginning to «n6* Another criterion already
discussed was their previous experience in reporting
military affairs* or their presumed experience with mili-
tary affairs based upon a tour of considerable length in
the military service. The prestige or total readership of
a correspondent's parent publication or news service was
also an important factor in his selection.
Based upon the above criteria, 12 of the approxi-
mately 30 correspondents to the court were selected. They
are as follows:
CprgflsgQndant htiil 1stion
Richard 8. Meyer Associated Press
Wayne Thomls Chicago Tribune
Curtis J. Sitomsr Christian Science Monitor
Julian Hartt Los Angelas Times
Karl Fleming
Bernard Berelson, {frM^Mfl* *Mlyai* ia
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Barnard Weinraub The Maw York Times
Kip Coopar San Diego Union
Jim Q. Lucaa Scrippe-Howard Bows alliance
Tin Tylar Tina
ftobert Crabbe United Preaa International
Jack V. Fox United Preaa International
George C. Wilson Washington Post
To establish their previous experience in reporting
military affairs* a short questionnaire %tmm sent to each
correspondent (sea appendix A) • Jim €3. Lucas &L^C before
the researcher could query him about hia background* but
Scripp»-Howarc, the publishers of his several books* and
other secondary sources provided neceasary data*
Jack V* Pox was not in continuous attendance at the
court* but his reputation as a correspondent made the
analysis of his stories desirable.
Most correspondents' stories ware by-lined. How-
ever* AP* UPX and particularly Xisam and saWtttosk reports
often appeared without identification of the writer. The
problem of attribution was recognised and relieved somewhat
by concentrating on reporting of court events and specifics
relating directly to those events. Where attribution was
made too difficult by the nature of the atory* the partic-
ular report was not included in this study.
The timeliness of a news report waa not generally
considered a critical •lament in this study. For the most
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part* correspondents' reports of an open court session
appeared in their publication the next day. The inclusive
dates of this study* January 20th to Kerch 13th, encompass
the publication dates of all news stories pertinent to this
study* with the exception of sons early Xiffia and m**»««*^
reports. These, where used* have been specifically
mentioned ss early reports. Furthermore, the weekly
appearance of the news magaxine reports of the inquiry
permitted their correspondents to develop the*es more fully
<
end in some esses more accurately* than journalists for
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The public had been exposed to intense coverage of
the Pueblo affair since the crow's arrival at San Diego.
Amid the intrinsically emotional stories of reunited
families and North Korean torture of the men. there
appeared bit by bit the complex le$ai procedures, adminis-
trative details and military traditions which were the
foundation and framework for the Pueblo Court of Inquiry,
The piecemeal appearance of this material can be attributed
to its very complexity—there were too many important
details for the Havy to release or the correspondents to
report all at once.
However, three correspondents at the court made an
effort to draw all the fragments of pertinent information
together in reports which appeared* and thereby announced
the opening of the court, on January 20*
Headlined "Havy to Open Inquiry Today." Julian
Bartt's article was quite accurate and comprehensive. Com-
paring the military court of Inquiry to a civilian grand
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procedural briefings during the weeks preceding the court.
and cited excerpts from Kevy Regulations and the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCKJ) a which he correctly sug-
gested might have a bearing on the inquiry. The result was
a cohesive, easily understood exposition which provided a
sound basis for the reader who followed the court from
beginning to end.
The navy constantly stressed that the incuiry was
not a trial but a fact-finding body. Bartt reinforced that
point by comparing the investigation to a grand jury
proceeding and by quoting an unidentified Havy legal
specialist as follow* i *. . . the court 'cannot punish, but
4it certainly can recommend punishment .'
*
Calling Commander Bucher the key witness. Bartt
explained that his designation as a "party** to the investi-
gation entitled him to certain rights. Of these, he cited
the right to attend all hearings, to cross-examine
witnesses, and the right to be represented by counsel. Be
also suggested an essential, but difficult to interpret.
llU im MJMit nSgHl.lt ions. 1948. Art. 0730.
of Military OosiIqa. 10 use 395.
May 5. 1950. Art* 31* hereafter cited as UCMJ. Also con-
tained in Manual £qx Ca*rf-Marfclal . 19&9 (ft^i«~^ ,
hereafter cited as MCM.
i£ft S'W 1 ** Ttirwi January 20. 1969. S*c. X.
P. 3.
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concept of the "party 4* procedure whan he wrote* "Others of
the 81 survivors (the Pueblo crew) • . • may be designated
'parties' by the court at any time testimony indicates they
might possibly be subject to subsequent charges.'*5 Hartt's
suggestion was amplified by his comment that the
of a vessel or unit involved in an inquiry automatically is
"a party.*6
Nevertheless, he failed to interpret the philosophy
behind the procedure in such a way that it could be fully
understood. Re also failed to list perhaps the most crucial
legal right afforded a party to a military investigation*
and for that matter a witness before a grand jury. Bartt
can be held responsible for a more lucid interpretation
because pertinent military documents covering these matters*
and numerous qualified legal experts* were available to him
for consultation.
Taking the last point first* the crucial legal
right which Bartt could have mentioned to improve his
coverage was that part of the advisement read to a party at
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June 2* 1961* Chapters XXI and XV. Hereafter this document
will be cited as *1M ttJUXUAl* Copies of pertinent extracts
were made available to the reporters.
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• • • /he caa/ refuse to incriminate bistselX* and, if
accused or suspected of an offense* /he can/ be
informed of the nature of the accusation mnA advised
that he does not have to sMike any statement regarding
the offense of which he is accused or suspected; and
that any statement made by him may be used as evidence
against him in a trial by court-martial.8
With regard to the effect of designation as a
party* it might have been noted* more effectively than
Bartt did. that.
The purpose and effect of designating an individual
before a fact-finding body is to afford him a hearing
respecting possibly adverse information concerning his
conduct or performance of duty or relating to a matter
ever which he has a duty or right to exercise official
control. 9
This concise quote contains the essential philosophy
by which the commanding officer of a vessel which is lost
or damaged is automatically designated a party to the
subsequent investigation.
There is little doubt that a clear understanding of
these legal concepts was essential in order to comprehend
the actions of the court of inquiry. Hartt's laudable
attempt to promote this understanding is especially note*
worthy and far exceeded the efforts of his fellow corre-
spondents on January 20.
George Wilson preferred to deal in interpretation
in his article, entitled "The Pueblo Inquiryt *11 Sides Are
tUbtt tUUmAL* SOL* fiit. . pp. 3-3.
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Lowers." Ha began with the eaaily misunderstood state-
ment* "A skipper, his ship* hia service . . . all 90 on
public 'trial' today • . . ml1 Latar in the article, Wilson
much needed, hut atill insufficient* amplification to
hia initial comments
Mo matter what happens during the Pueblo court of
inquiry* none of the participants can emerge whole.
sucher will be stained in the eyes of a service not
known for forgive and forget* • • • The Pueblo will 90
down aa a ahip not equipped for its job. ... The Bavy
... will 90 down as allowing a tactical situation to
get out of hand to escalate into an international
incident. 12
Hot until one read through to the jure? page where
his first-page article was continued did the reader find
Wilson's comment which distinguished the inquiry clearly
from an adversary proceedings "The court is simply a fact-*
finding body. Xt can build a caae for a court-martial but
cannot bring such proceedings itself.* This was the
point most often stressed by Bavy officials about the
nature of the forthcoming inquiry. Although Wilaon had
stressed this point in some earlier articles* the fact that
the court was not a trial should have appeared in the same
paragraph with his initial comment to preclude any mis-
interpretation of his statement.
p. 1.
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Wilson appeared to have difficulty with another
important issue before the court in hie analysis of the
code of conduct and its application to the Pueblo men.
Mentioning that the Navy's Judge advocate General (J*G) had
ruled the Pueblo crewmen were "illegal detainees'* rather
than prisoners of war (POtts) • he said* This apparently
means there is no intention to court"martial any of the men
for their confessions" (uttered and signed while in north
Korea). 14
However, in explanatory comments about the Navy JAG
ruling. Captain Mewsome said only* Th» code of conduct
does not apply to the Pueblo crew* " and* even more to the
point* navy legal specialist Captain Gale B. Xrouse
commented to the press* "The code is a creed* a guideline*
as distinct from a legal statute. It was never anyone's
intent that the code of conduct be used as s basis for
punishment." 16 from these comments* the implication
logically follows that* even if the code had been applied
to the Pueblo crew (and Navy JAG later during the court so
ordered) * it could not properly be used as a legal statute
14lbJ£.
15ppinion expressed by Captain William R.
JAGC* UBS* in a press conference at the u. S. Naval
Amphibious Base* Coronado* California* January 13* 1969,
Opinion expressed by Captain Gale i>. Krouse*
JLQ&* filfc.
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under which members of the crew could be brought to court-
martial. If the court hod deemed the confessions of the
crew to be in violation of military law* they would have
been charged under the UGHJ* a situation which could have
occurred without application of the code of conduct*
Finally* Wilson did not address himself to the
difficult legal philosophy and procedures as did Julian
Hartt* although he did cite the content of Article 0730 of
JmtSCX Imtmlit ^ftm under which Bucher was eventually charged
by the court.
Bernard tfeinraub also dealt with the code of
pans'act in his January 20 story* and did so by commenting
on both sides of the issue* He paraphrased the belief of
"several lawyers" that the code was totally applicable to
the Pueblo men who "confessed" to espionage while held by
the North Koreans, lie contrasted the position with "other
lawyers" who believed the powers of the code were limited
and not legally binding* Finally* he quoted the opinions
17
of Captain Krouse already mentioned. This treatment
afforded the reader the best opportunity to form his own
opinion based upon Weinraub's balanced presentation of the
IS
contrasting views*
TWO other elements in the code of conduct contro-
versy were distinguished in s XJjoa essay* While the XJJUL
Opinion of Captain Gale B. Krouse* lac* all.*
imV. XttCk XiOttft* January 20* 1969* Sec. I*
p. 9.
It
m <r I* *o**»IoJt* «A *d o*
»Vf '"* nokfmMZm ft J
lustm M
o>. qtm •# "EwUmW Oiltf «• oXcfot«
--.It vz*m •too fwf* to ftattwoi +if* b»¥»JU»«t odw '
crtoiiMo •** b*ta* *«** ill***!
i n^0 mm MftMifi
9 **;
I .set .tfttl ,0C rap—* .Ai&JLl J&BX 1MB JMflE*1 A •«
32
at the end of the first week of hearings,
was at an advantage over news reports filed 10 days
earlier, nevertheless it drew upon facts established long
before the court opened. First, it pointed out some
Defense officials* argument that a POST should be given
authority to make confessions not dealing with classified
information nor injurious to fellow prisoners because such
a well-publicised official policy would drain confessions
of any real significance, and permit the FOW some flexibil-
ity in dealing with his captors* Second, the Xitta. essay
compared this recommandatlon to the similar action taken by
the United States when it signed a North Korean propaganda
document, which the United States previously denounced as
false, thereby "confessing* that the Pueblo was inside
north Korean waters, in order to secure the release of the
19
crew.* These two widely known arguments supported those
who were in favor of a relaxation of the stoical demands on
POms made by the existing code, and deserved mention in any
in-depth news report of the controversy over the applic-
ability of the code to the Pueblo's situation.
Thm first Pay
20
Coverage of the actual proceedings at the court's
i9
2iffl* fisaay. "New Compassion for the Prisoner of
War," Tiffin. January 31, 1969, pp. 16-17.
References to the numbered day of each court
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first session concentrated on Bucher *s testimony that his
requests of the Havy for systems to improve the Pueblo's
ability to destroy secret equipment « to communicate
internally, and to defend itself from enemy attack vers
generally not granted. Moos of the correspondents reporting
the first day's proceedings Mentioned the most significant
court's advisement to Commander Bucher regarding his legal
rights as a party to the investigation, and in particular
the possibility that at some point tn the proceedings he
might become suspected of a violation of the UCHJ. This
was an omission of essential court procedure which, if
reported, would have helped the reader to understand one of
the primary purposes of the Pueblo Court of Inquiry—to
determine if any evidence before the court revealed a
21possible violation of military law.
Bernard weinraub, waking no significant errors in
his report, correctly predicted perhaps the two most impor-
tant findings of the court regarding Bucher *s actions in
ending the Pueblos
Bucher *s failure or inability to destroy
secret equipment on his ship is expected to be a key
issue at the Court of Inquiry. ... The fact that the
ttorth Koreans boarding the ship Vex* not repulsed is
also expected to be a key issue. 22
Julian Hartt's reference to Bucher *s testimony was
P. 12.
2lJMA HAOUAl* Chapter IV, pp. 4-1 to 4-6.






in error in several areaa. Bucher had recommended either
20-milliaeter or 40-miiliswter guns be installed on
Pueblo* not m2Qma or 30am weapons* as Hartt reported. 24
Also, Bucher 's operational commander for the Pueblo's
mission* whom he frequently aentioned in first-day testi-
mony* was Rear Admiral Prank L. Johnson. Hartt erroneously
identified this central figure in the investigation as a
Vice Admiral. 25
On the day of the attack* Bucher testified* the
•50-caliber guns finally installed on Pueblo could not have
been brought into play against the north Koreans very
quickly because their protective canvas covers were heavily
coated with ice which formed in the frigid atmosphere of
the northern Sea of Japan. 8s did not say* as Hartt
reported* "... the canvas covers were so heavy with ice
• . • the crew couldn't get them off anyhow. " The issue
was important to the determination of why the Pueblo had
not been defended when attacked.
Bucher also testified about what he thought might
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28Japan once the Pueblo was on the mission. As Hartt
reported, Bucher said the difficulty was in getting someone
in Japan to accept radio transmissions from the Pueblo*
that he discussed it in briefings before the mission, and
that it had not been resolved to his satisfaction at that
time. But, Bucher did not establish in his testimony that
the difficulty was in the chain of command. However, Hartt
incorrectly interpreted from Bucher* s comments that, "There
was the beginning of an implication of confusion in the
29
chain of command.
It should be noted, however, that Bucher 's testi-
mony in this area was somewhat vague, owing to the
classified nature of Naval communications equipment and the
commands concerned. As Captain Newsome stipulated, this
was the reason he directed Bucher not to continue his
testimony about the Pueblo's communications difficulties.
Hartt should have noted this fact when he reported i "But
Capt. William R. Newsome, USN, the court's counsel who
guides the testimony, quickly shut off that line. " With-
out mentioning exactly why testimony was stopped, Hartt 's
report left the reader with the possible impression that
testimony was "shut off because it might be embarrassing
p. 22.
28
Court jtecord,. Vol. 1, p. 46.
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In a comprehensive report of the first day's
proceedings, George Wilson reported all the main points of
Bucher *s testimony and highlighted Bucher *s inability to
acquire a destruet system for the Pueblo. Wilson sought to
balance the concentration on Bucher*s testimony with a
cement about the court's probable reaction to the almost
uninterrupted monologue. To do so, Wilson isolated one of
Captain ftewsome's questions of Bucher as follows*
*t one point • • • ttewsome, the Havy lawyer serving as
counsel for the court . . . pointed to inspection
reports in which Bucher had said the Pueblo was ready
to perform her mission. The exchange was light* Jiitfc
no flavor of prosecutor vs. defendant. But his /sic/
may be the way one oi the issues develops, with the
Havy using Bucher *s past words to defend the condition
of the ship it gave him to command .31
Wilson's interpretation of Mewsome 's question and
the possible reasoning behind it makes the unwarranted
assumption that the court, through ttewsome, was attempting
to "defend" the condition of the ship. It might more
logically be presumed that the court counsel sought to
elicit Bucher 's reasoning in signing inspection reports,
the content of which aasmsd to contradict his testimony.
Kip Cooper, reporting in the &*m ULmtQ. ifcUOQ as its
military affairs editor, wrote the most complete account of
the proceedings of January 20. touching on every major item
31
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which Sucher, the only witness for the day, raised in hie
testimony. The only significant error he committed was
similar to the Misquotation made by Julian Bartt about the
severity of the icing conditions on the gun covers. Cooper
nistaJcenly said of Sucher *s testimony that he claimed the
guns became caked over with ice and their canvas covers
32frose to them making them unuseable.
Richard Meyer, the Associated Press reporter,
incorrectly wrote that Commander Sucher spoke of not having
enough "weighted paper bags" in which to sink secret docu-
33
ments when the Pueblo was attacked. In fact, these bags
were canvas, and Sucher spoke of their being arommetted to
admit water quickly. 34
Later in the same article the *P reported, •• • •
the Havy ordered two 50-califoer guns for the Pueblo. Those-
he /Buchejc/ said, would have been too heavy and he recom-
mended 20-mm. or 40 mm."35 What sucher said was that, as a
result of the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty in 1967,
the office of the Chief of Naval Operations (CtfO) had
ordered "3-inch-50s" be installed on small, independently
Sec. I, p. 1,
AAA aiaaa Unlets* January 21, 1969, Sec. I, p. 1.
January 21, 19*9,
34
Gaixx. ftacacm, vol. i, p. 58.
* Asupaea* lac. fiifc.
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operating vassals. These guns* firing a throe-inch shall
through a barrel SO times the length of the shell, would
have been too heavy for the Pueblo to carry on her 830-ton
hull* all of which Bucher explained to the court.
Jin Lucas used his dramatic columnist's style to
report the first day's proceedings. Short* quick comments




Be wrote that Bucher told of 'swallowing his
misgivings when ordered to arm his noncombatant vessel.
Bather* Bucher had variously said of the CNO decision to
arm the Pueblos
... I personally encouraged it. • • . The way I felt*
and the way I discussed it in my wardroom and with. —
other people who Z had talked to in the shipyard /ytho/
thought it would only draw attention to us. ... My
reply to them was that the CUO in his capacity as the
senior officer in the Bevy had decided that it was
necessary ... and Z felt* Z was in complete agreement
and supported his feelings because he knows a lot more
about this type thing than Z do. And Z supported the
idea of arming the ship ... from the very beginning*
as soon as Z found out where the direction had come
from. Z never questioned it at any time. 39
His paraphrase of this difficult-to-interpret
statement was an oversimplification of Bucher *s testimony.
Accuracy would have been served better by a direct or
indirect quote.
BflCourt Uncord , Vol. 1* p. 39.
- (Denver)* January 21* 1969,
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Lucas also keyed on certain of Newsome's questions
in a way which effectively showed the court's attention to
the problem of the Pueblo's readineaa for her mission to
the readers
Many of the court's questions obviously were asked for
a purposes Bad he held repel boarders* drills? He had
but not often. Had he trained his men to scuttle ship?
Again he had but not frequently.4®
Lucas apparently believed the reader could deter-
none for himself what was the purpose of the court* because
he did not amplify on hie coseaent in this short article.
Other errors were committed by the correspondents
in their coverage of the first day of the court. These
were considered by the author to be insignificant in that
they did not bar a complete understanding of particular
facts in evidence* or of the first day taken as a whole.
For instance* one correspondent mistakenly said Bucher had
testified he recommended "gun tubes" be installed on the
deck of the Pueblo, aether. Bucher said he had recommended
"gun tubs" be installed. These* incidentally, are heavy
steel plates which are welded to the deck and encircle the
gun mount to provide aome protection for the gun crew.
Ths fte/TflndJttms
Bucher continued his uninterrupted
Bacfcy. ****"*!'n«r jfam las. six.'
UP I story in the ^**«*g^ Itiauisa* January 21*
1969, Sec. X* p. 1
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testimony on January 21, concentrating on eventa occurring
after tbe Pueblo had begun her miaeion in the water
surrounding North Korea. By the end of the court day he
had reached the final hectic momenta juat before hia
attacker* boarded the ahip.
Jim Lucaa waa incorrect in hia interpretation of
Bucher'e teetiaony regarding two civilian oceanographere
who were members of the Pueblo* a crew. The Scrippe-Howard
correapondent reported of Bucher, The atory he told wae of
... a ahip which purpoaely concealed ita real mission
• • •" Though that touch wae correct* Lucaa then wrote in
parentheaee* "Bucher ordered 'cover' oceanographic opera-
42tiona begun only after he waa detected • • •"
However* Bucher teatified that the oceanographere
were aboard to fulfill a bona-fide mieeion in addition to
the ahip* a primary mission, and that the Pueblo atopped at
nuaaroua pointa to permit them to take samples of the aea
water and bottom*
The normal routine during the day while on station • .
waa to accommodate the oceanographera aa much as
possible. Twenty atationa had been delineated • . •
that they would like to obtain varioua oceanography
data from. . • . 2 attempted* and waa successful in
making theee . • . points and allowing /them/ to
collect their data . . .43
2mlB2hi& £X£ftA S&lmiSJUL* January 22* 1969, Sec. I,
p. 5.
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Presumably, Uicas derived his faulty interpretation
from Bucher's additional cessment that ha never allowed the
oceanographic teats to interfere with the military mission
of the Pueblo. 44
The *J> report by Richard Meyer osuitted Bucher's
denial of each of the intrusions into their waters alleged
45by the North Koreans. To establish what waa already
commonly accepted. Captain Bewsomo asked Bucher, of each of
the 17 separate intrusions alleged, whether on that date*
at that time* and in that place a particular entry into
north Korean territorial waters had been committee by the
Pueblo. To each question, ha answered, 'sio Sir, it did
not." Because the court went to such lengths to insure
the record showed no intrusions had occurred, it must be
considered that the dialogue was relevant enough to be at
least mentioned in a report of the day 'a events.
JacK Pox of the UPI reported, of Bucher's testimony
about sending radio messages to his superiors notifying
them of Pueblo's situation, thatt "... he had flashed a
radio alarm that should have gone to the top military
command •ngi to the White Bouse** This comment came immedi-
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was no help in sight. " Fox's us* of the verb tens*
"should hav* gone" incorrectly suggests the message did not
reach its multiple destinations* while the testimony made
clear that it did.
Bernard Weinraub's thorough article contained one
significant misquotation. Bucher testified that after
being wounded by fcorth Korean gunfire he resumed control of
the ship within "five seconds.
*
48 but Weinraub reported
Bucher as saying* "X maintained control of the ship within
fivs minutes sfter it happened* Time elements were
critical throughout the day's testimony* and a ship not
under command for a period as long as five minutes while
under attack is almost inconceivable.
«sorge Wilson reported Bucher *s testimony that he
considered trying to scuttle the ship but decided not to
because, even if it had sank, the North Koreans might be
able to use divers to retrieve secret equipment on board
sines the depth of the water was only 180 feet. Having
referred to this part of the testimony. Wilson also should
January 22. 1969. Sec. I. p. 2.
^fliiinirt IAGEUC&* Vol. 1. p. 102,
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reported that court teember Rear Adasirai Bdward ft.
Crista challenged Bucher'e reasoning by asking him What
would hava prevented tha United States from ealvaging the
Pueblo if it waa in international waters a# he had
testified. 51
Although Wilson did not mention Sucher*s denial of
the 17 intrusions in his article* the £aal reproduced the
Navy's chart of the Pueblo's route through the Sea of Japan
that had been prepared for the press by the CIS. The
reproduction and the acconpanying story * "Course of Pueblo
is Mapped* *52 no doubt by Wilson* stake it clear the alleged
intrusions never occurred.
The Third Ely
Two stories of the significant court events of
January 22* 1969* appeared in TJsm Washington £&•&• The
first of these carried the wore prominent headline* was by*
lined "By a Washington Post Staff Writer* and was data-
lined "OOftOtfADO* Calif.* . . ."53 The second story* by
George Wilson* was labeled 'Sews Analysis" mm
just beneath the main story* in the ninth column. Wilson
also wrote the sain story. The placement of the storiea
S1
£aarjL ftsfiacd. Vol. 1* p. 104.
52The £OB£* ifl£. eifc.. p. A13.
53^ £oj&* January 22* 1969* Sec. X*
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and the prorainenca of the headlinoa is important because of
the error in the first headline.
It read. "Bucher Is Told He Faces Trial in Ship
Seizure." But in fact, the following events took place.
Just after Bucher reached the point in his testimony where
the North Koreans were permitted to come aboard the Pueblo.
Captain lewsowe halted the session for a brief recess*
during which, presumably* he Informed Pueblo's commanding
officer that he was about to be placed under suspicion by
the court for a violation of military law. Following the
t. Captain Mewiome made the following commentt
Commander Bucher, it is my duty to apprise you of the
fact, that the facts revealed in this Court of Inquiry,
renders you to be a suspect of a violation of the
United States naval Regulations Article 0730, which
reads, "the Commanding Officer shall not submit his
command to be searched by any person representing s
foreign stater will not permit any of the personnel
under his command to be removed from his command by
such persons so long as he has the power to resist.**
You are further advised that having been so informed
of that offense you do not have to make any statement
with respect to it. /snd any statement that you make
with respect to it thereafter be used as evidence
•gainst you in a subsequent trial. 54
Unlike the headline, the warning did not categor-
ically state that Commander Bucher would without question
be tried because of the court's contention that he had
violated regulations. There was ample opportunity to learn*
from pre** conferences and by talking to counsel for the
court, that the court was only empowered as a fact*finding
S4
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body to determine what happened mid to recommend further
action, if any,
fortunately* the headline did not agree with
Wilson's lead paragraph Which said, "Cstdr. Uoyd M. fcucher
of the Pueblo was told by a Naval court of inquiry today
that he say be court-martialed for allowing North Koreans
to board his ship." Obviously* the word "may" was
essential to understanding the event because the decision
to bring Commander Bucher to court-martial rested with the
Naval authority Who convened the court* the Commander'*in*
Chief of the Pacific Fleet* not with the court, further-
more* that decision could not be rendered until the court
had completed its inquiry and forwarded the investigation
to the convening authority.
Later in the story* however* Wilson compounded the
error of the headline by writings
Until today, Bucher had only been a "party" to the
court proceedings* His testimony was designed to help
the court get the full facts* not to establish charges
against Bucher or anyone else. . . 56
This statement was an oversimplification of the
effect of designation as a party* for such designation at
the outset of an investigation warns the individual that
the fact-finding body is already aware that adverse infor-
mation concerning his conduct or performance of duty may
55
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result from the inquiry. 37 Wilson's statement was also in
error because it implied by use of the phrase "Until today"
that* after the warning to Bucher, the court would attempt
to further establish the charge against him. Rather, the
court # from beginning to end* was primarily concerned with
learning all the facts as well as determining if those
58facts suggested some person or persons were at fault.
nevertheless* Wilson, still in error, continued
t
The character of this proceeding ... has therefore
changed, even though it is still technically an 'inquiry'
rather than a 'trial.'* 59 His implication that Bucher was
now on trial is evident, and of course incorrect.
Wilson's second article was headlined, "A Skipper
Takes On 'The System. * M*° Leading with "A first chapter of
one of the many books osaviny out of the Pueblo Inquiry
might be called Bucher vs. 0. S. Navy or Boys Town vs.
Annapolis, Wilson characterised Bucher as ". . . 'the
mustang* • • • taking on the 'system.'"
Bucher wss raised as an orphan at Boys Town, Nebras-
ka, and the court members were Annapolis graduates, thus
accounting for Wilson's interpretive comment. However, the
57
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point of contrast b«twtn a high-school-level orphanage and
a college-level Military academy is a vague one at boat.
Be might mora accurately have cor.tr mated the admirals* alma
oiater* the Naval Academy* and Bucher *s alma mater* the
University of Nebraska. 61
Also* while it may be a point of conjecture* Bucher
was not* strictly defined* a "mustang. * In Kaval parlance*
the "mustang" is* as Wilson states* ". . . an officer who
moves up from the ranks. " In other words* a "mustang" is
sn officer who received a direct conssission while serving
as an enlisted man. But* Bucher received his commission
through the Reserve Officer Training Corps program after
leaving the enlisted Naval service* and after receiving a
62baccalaureate degree from the University of Nebraska —an
evolution of events which corresponds to the pattern
followed by many officers in the armed services.
Later in his "analysis" Wilson referred to the
"glittering admirals" preparing a "strategy for the
counterattack" on Bucher 's first-day testimony describing
the poor materiel condition of the Pueblo and the cutback
in funds for its conversion to an intelligence-collection
vessel. Wilson illustrated this alleged "counterattack"















with accurate indirect quotes of the court's questions to
Bucher. commenting. "The admirala were clubbing Bucher with
the obvious weapon— • • •"
Oddly enough* the weapon to which Wilson referred
is a Naval tradition that, despite his negative use of it
in the context of the article, could not be reduced in its
importance to Bucher 's situation. Wilson concisely stated
it*
• • • the centuries-old understanding that the captain,
and nobody else, is in charge of his ship. If Bucher
as captain did not think his ship was up to her
mission, then he should not have taken her out.
Wilson next referred to the proceedings in general
as s "gentlemanly inquisition" Where. "The stiletto flashes
out from the dark blue row of admirals* coats . • • only
occasionally. " and concluded the factual part of his story
by recalling court questions challenging Bucher *s testimony
from previous sessions.
Despite the fact that the story was labeled "Sews
Analysis." that qualification could not cloak editorialising
and reasoning apparently flavored by personal opinion and
emotion, which seemed to do little to aid the reader's clear
understanding of the day's events. One could, however, see
Wilson's attempt to speak to the relationship between the
"system" or organisation—the Savy—and the man—Bucher.
Certainly* one of the major issues never resolved by the
court was where Bucher 's responsibility for the incident
ended, and the Navy's responsibility for the incident began.
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One could applaud an analytical news report Which dealt
forthright ly with this issue and logically criticised the
affair. In my opinion* Wilson failed to achieve this point
in his article.
By contrast* the coverage by Jim Lucas was without
error and far more balanced in its approach. Headlined
'Talkative Bucher Appears Seeded for Court Martial."63 his
article dealt with the changing atmosphere of the court as
followsi
ft the outset* the court was outwardly friendly* the
five admirals almost fatherly in their manner toward
Bucher* the court's attorney a helpful friend. But the
atmosphere has gradually changed* the court's questions
become sharper. Then yesterday came the sharpest blow
of all.
Again by contrast* the gHir»«^ 2£jL&uaft« using the
report by Jack Vox of UPI* headlined in a banner head*
"savy Warns Pueblo Chief* Comdr. Bucher Told lie Nay Go On
Trial* u and* "Ship's Skipper Advised of His Rights.-64
Fox's article* a straightforward report of the events of
the day, did not deal with the apparent mood of the court.
Bernard Weinraub's article* under the headlinn*
"Navy Court Puts Bucher Under Suspicion* H most effectively
used a disclaimer to the inherently sensational warning to
as follows:
63!3sWh*Ul Adeems, Sfiiaitax* January 23* 1969* Sec. Z*
p. 4.
£hiCftg£ Tri^uoa . January 23* 1969* Sec* I* p. 1.
Tfra jfeat vogfe XiASm* January 23* 1969* Sec. Z,
P- 1.





Havy legal officers emphasised that the court of
inquiry remained a fact-finding panel that could not
prosecute hut could recommend that court-martial action
against Commander Buchar be started. "What this means.*
ona legal officer said, "is that they have heard enough
evidence to be convinced that Bucher is suspected of
violating Navy regulations. They have to tell him that
he is under suspicion. He has to be warned under the




Within 48 hours of the warning to Bucher the court
was deluged with approximately 490 letters and telegrams
from members of the public outraged over what they believed
was mistreatment of the commander by the court, and an
obvious attempt to make him a scapegoat for the Havy's
shortcomings in the Pueblo incident. Probably no amount
of dispassionate, accurate reporting would have dispelled
67
the emotional reaction to the warning given Bucher.
Zt can also be said, on the basis of the foregoing
analysis of coverage of the court up to and including the
warning, that the press was probably not as much to blame
68
for the negative public reaction as many suspected.
Those correspondents in this study whose
January 23rd reports were not mentioned were factually
accurate in their coverage of the events of January 22.
6
*Xbid.. p. 12.
*7Bstimates of the pieces of mall maA telegrams to
the court, while highly speculative, ran to about 400.
Similarly, the CIS received numerous angry telephone calls*
some of which the author answered.
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These unmentioned reports invariably headlined the warning
to Buchar, indisputably tha moat important avant of tha
day* a proceedings* and raportad tha court action correctly
without undua emotional ovartona or editorialisation.
fOttKth Pay
Buchar continued his uninterrupted testimony on
January 23. relating, for tha most part* tha arrival of tha
Pueblo at tha Sorth Korean port of tfonsan and tha aubse-
quent frantic effort a of hia captora* through frequent
threats and brutal torture methods* to extract an early
confession to espionage from hint*
Tha events of tha preceding day seemed to have a
cathartic affect on tha correspondents as evidenced by
their attention to detail and to tha development in print
of tha amotion which Buchar displayed and expressed mm ha
described his feelings about trying to commit auicide
rather than submit to tha pressure his captors applied on
his mind and body.
Some* such as Jim Lucas* however* aearned to inadver-
tently inject their own emotional reactions to Buchar *s
testimony into their reports.
Lucas reported* "... Buchar has unfolded a story
of his captivity so gruesome that even his chief inquisitor,
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blanched and asked that he 'omit macabre details. •"*9
never used tha word macabre* according to the £OU£&
However, ha did say* of Buchar'a questioning
whether ha should discuss in open court tha wounds of his
men* "Unless it serves sons useful point I would omit sobs
of tha details. -70
lbs fifth Pfty Through tha
eighth Pay
For the remainder of the first and early part of
the second week* the court convened in closed sessions
which the correspondents were not permitted to attend.
During this period the court heard testimony on classified
matters from Commander Bucher* his immediate operational
commander* Rear Admiral frank L. Johnson* and members of
tha admiral's staff in Japan at the time of the Pueblo
incident.
*a most of the press reported* the CIB produced
unclassified reports of the testimony taken in closed
sessions and distributed them to the press as soon after
the proceedings as was practicable--usually within a few
hours of the court* s adjournment.
Also during this period* the CXB began to make
available to the press upon request the first written drafts
69
HaBBhi* RJUUUL acjtaifcaX* January 24* 1969. Sec. I.
p. 2.
7
°CfiU2CL ftjmttBC&* Vol. 1* p. 182.
n
**•» tow ft*4M»l<i
r^ym£% ^ ,u»ar .f^dooM few *<i* &••« *•"*» «•*•«
r*aup e'wrtws %© •<«•• **& «* *wr»a« 4a****\
aM *!«•*• •* «M»
.•lJ«*ro Mf^ *o
itrnrf &*•©!* «± »«t»va«o **tio?> «** ***** *noo**
#af Mi *M r*r* •*a*>btio**»'**** *** *•***
jbal&imrio a© jllirn asm* ***«* «f* bo is*) •!*** &*!»*
baami aid .s«*fc*#a s#6«mh©9 r»st •*•****
ataaa *&* r©****©* .a *«***« Irsia** »•*
„*«. ©?** la *»** «fc* *• ©rqrfc i »*i©si«®r
fcaoufer *©* «briioqr^ »•»*>* ©*i? i© *•©* I
£»OHl*»»i ©fl* to ******* bvitl—*
at at
... , ,_. v ^ . - » *nj[»iiHH| if~ HirtMMiM ©«
erfrx ©3 !»&»©©* 63 rife ,©©!*©% ©id* »axs^o o
©.gu errs* ***
%l .aa© ,££«?! %©C \s*w«rs» tjaJiflAai MUO& *X*mW*m
53
of Kavy court reporters* voice transcriptions of the open
court sessions. This procedure continued without interrup-
tion until the court closed. However* midway through the
court* the Navy tightened the restrictions on the press use
of the verbatim record because it was believed the newsmen
were doing sore than had been intended by the Havy-they
were taking voluminous verbatim notes from the record
rather than just checking the accuracy of their past*
present and future reports. Thereafter* newsmen were per-
mitted to see the CXB copy of the record only in the
presence of a CXB official* for brief periods of time* and
were not permitted to take extensive quotations out of the
record.
The impact of public reaction displayed in hundreds
of letters and telegrams to Commander Bueher after the
court placed him under suspicion caused him to direct his
civilian attorney* £• Miles Harvey* to hold a press confer-
ence on January 27* 1969. Previously* Bueher and Harvey
had notified the press they would make no formal comments
pending completion of the inquiry.
At the suddenly called conference* Harvey* using
Bueher 's words he said* commented that the commander desired
Navy legal authorities in Washington* 0. C*
presumably from reading and listening to news reports*
apparently concluded that liberties were being taken with
the record and directed that the CZB tighten its control of
the r<
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to reaaaure the American public that ha waa receiving
"eminently fair" treatment by tha Davy court of inquiry.
Bucher* ha said, wanted to counteract what ha believed waa
tha "overreaction" of people to hia being declared a
72
auapect of violating naval regulations.
Tha ninth Pay
The court reeumed open aeaalona on January 29 , a
fact which moat of the eorreapondenta had been anticipating
in their reports for two daya becauae the moat notable
cloaed-court witness, Rear Admiral Johnson, waa acheduled
to appear in the firat open session of the aecond week of
hearinga.
Julian Hartfa anticipatory report of the 29th of
January reiterated Bueher*e testimony regarding Johnson's
ordera about ueing the fifty-caliber guna on the Pueblo in
the event of confrontation with a foreign force. Ha incor-
rectly paraphraeed Bucher aa aayingt "Bucher hae teatifiad
that Ads. Johneon told him not to uncover hia machine guna
in defense of the Pueblo." 73 However. Bucher teatifiad.
"One of the precautione and one of the laet things Admiral
*Thie conference waa widely reported in newspapers
of the 28th of January.
73. January 29. 1969. Sec. X
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Johnson said to km» . . . was that I should in no way
uncover those •guns unless it was absolutely necessary . • .
^thay7 were to be used in the event all else failed in
extracting ourself from a harassment situation. M
Kip Cooper's report of the proceedings of
January 29 was a thorough summary of most of the major areas
into which testimony had delved* as were all of his reports
of open sessions throughout the inquiry. Using numerous
direct quotes* Cooper related Johnson's testimony and the
court's questions about his planning for* but inability to,
provide assistance for the Pueblo on the day she was
seised.
noteworthy in Cooper's report was his coverage of
testimony by Commander Charles ft. Clark who had formerly
been the commander of the Pueblo 4 a sister ship, the
JrnUL fiajQUQax* Cooper chose parts of that testimony which put
Bucher's previous testimony about the suitability of the
Pueblo into a perspective not previously available.
Cooper reported
i
Clark • • • told the court that he and his crew knew a
swift reaction time was not possible. "We operated
quite a distance from the normal operating area of
other U. &. units. Zh* military has no authority to
invoke a war ... /ia/ our operating area we could
have been rammed or sunk before anyone could have come
to our assistance. Clark told the court he felt that
the Banner was a "small cheap resource" that was
adequate for the general concept of a small unarmed
74
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Julian Hartt's report in the ***?*ft 6 used very
nearly the law quotas mm did Cooper to *ake the point that
Clark 'a testimony was *. • • in some weys contradictory to
that of . . . Bucher."77
In a thorough ** report* however* Richard Meyer
gave the roost conprehenaive report of Clark 'a testimony.
While he did not etreea the point* of disagreement between
the two officera 1 comments* Meyer pointed out in hi* lead
that Clark atill believed in the concept of lightly armed
intelligence craft. Additionally, hie waa the only report
which stated that Clark agreed with Bucher in regard to the
excessive amounta of claaaified material on board the
Intelligence ahipa and the inadequate means to destroy the
material. 78
Because Hartt and Cooper raised the issue of
disagreement in Clark's testimony in their reports* each
was guilty of the omission of that part of the former
skipper's testimony which would also have shown there was a
significant amount of agreement between the two commanders.
73
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Ml of the remaining correspondents* while not
guilty of any significant factual errors in their
January 30 reports* oraittad coverage of Cox&sandar Clark's
testimony which would have provided the reader with the
means to discern the parallels and the divergences in their
viewpoints about the mission and operations of intelligence
ships*
Thm Tsnth Ely
The court again met in closed session on
January 30th. Thereafter the court adjourned until
February 3* 1969, on the advice of medical authorities who
determined that Coeoander Bucher was in need of a brief






B<twwB the last open court session on January 29
and the resumption of open testimony on February 4* many of
the correspondent* reported once again the significant
items that had appeared in earlier court sessions. Because
they had at their disposal many previous news reports* the
CIS releases* and the rough draft of the verbatim record*
no significant errors appeared in the correspondents* news
copy during this interim period.
Jim Lucas returned briefly to the January 29
testimony of the ifi& Jsuosx'a skipper* Charles *. Clark*
and noted* "Clark . • • said he couldn't have had a warmer
relationship with the commander of the Banner's 'research
spaces* ' that their two crews were interchangeable and the
research section was directly under his command.*
Lucas contrasted this testimony with a paraphrase
of Bucher's testimony that the command relationship aboard
the Pueblo between he and Lieutenant Stephen R. Harris* the
officer in charge of the Pueblo's research spaces* was
ifiioitsx* January 31* 1969* See. X*
p. 10.
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strained (by uo—iwnil influence external to the Pueblo) to
tha point that Bucher never believed ha had cooaaand control
2
of tha raaaarch detachment and ita personnel. Lucas*
raaaonabla intarpratation of tha contradictory situations
was that* "Bucher may have inadvertantly been hurt • • • by
the testimony of hia closest friend • Cradr. Charlea R.
Clark. . .- 3
Other press reports during this interim period
between open sessions introduced Stephen Harris to tha
reader based upon his steady appearance before the court in
closed sessions. ? Harvard College graduate* Harris was a
Bavy intelligence officer assigned to the Pueblo to take
charge of the 28-man group which conducted the ship's
intelligence-gathering efforts.
A XaBBt article appearing in the January 31 issue
showed a considerable amount of insight into the implica-
tions of the testimony of the previous two weeks of the
court on the part of its correspondent at the court.
As was to be expected* tha availability of tiae and
background documents* coupled with the opportunity to let




"The Pueblo. An Odyssey of Anguish Replayed*
•
January 31* 1969* pp. 14*16.
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publishing • report* gave the £lm* account a high degree of
accuracy. Bevertheless* in an apparent effort to compress
the complex teetinony into the report* some inaocuraciee
did appear.
Summarising Bucher *s long testimony about the prob-
lems of destroying secret documents* Xiao, reported that
Bucher *. . . could not know** that the destruction equip-
ment he had on board was inadequate to handle the volume of
classified material in a short period of time "because he
was not even cleared for access to the ship's supersecret
a
'research compartment. '* Rather* as commanding officer of
the Pueblo* Bucher knew, and testified to the effect* that
he had access to any compartment on his ship. Furthermore*
as he had testified* Bucher was fully aware of the location*
amount and general purpose of the highly classified
listening* recording* coding* and communication equipment
in the research compartment. This after all was the prime
reason he made repeated efforts to procure explosive
destruct devices for the compartment before the Pueblo
departed on her mission. What Bucher was not aware of was
the total amount* nor the specific content* of classified
documents which the research detachment held in its com-
partment. But* Bucher tacitly admitted he could have
determined the amount if he had exercised his right and
5lbM.
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duty as a commanding officers
The burning apace on the ship • • • the incinerator,
was not sufficient nor had X planned on the sufficiency
of the incinerator that was installed* nor had I prior
to going out oa patrol considered it in enough depth to
have appreciated the fact that we could not have*
except over a very long period of time* perhaps ten or
twelve hours* destroy all the publications that we had
on the ship. This was an oversight* a complete over-
sight* on ray part. The incinerator that was installed
would just not handle all the classified publications
that we had* and the water depth did not permit the
jettisoning of the publications over the side. 6
Bucher probably would not have sought to know the
actual content of the documents* save that it was classi-
fied (which he knew all along)* because he respected the
fact that* even as commanding officer of the Pueblo* he did
not "need to Know" in order to fulfill the Pueblo's
mission.
In another error* 2ioa omitted the court's rebuttal
to Bucher *s explanation that he decided not to scuttle the
Pueblo partly because he believed that North Korean divers
could easily have recovered the classified material on
board. *s has been mentioned* court member admiral Grimm
countered with the comment that the United States could
Vol. I* p. 121.
This commonly exercised military prohibition on
the release of classified information states that* even
though an individual has a security clearance broad enough
to see certain documents* unless he has an express need to
see the documents in order to complete his assigned
mission* or in general to do his job* he will not be given
access to the documents.
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just a» wo11 have salvaged the Pueblo's sensitive material
a
since she would have sunk in international waters.
On the positive side* however* the £ia& correspond-
ent commented that Rear Admiral Johnson's assurance to
Isomer that the Pueblo's guns would never he needed
to lull Bucher into a false sense of security which*
continued* might have explained his slow realisation that
the North Koreans would eventually attack* iSven more
significant to the issue of Bucher's possible culpability*
XJAt finished this particular section of the article with
the observation* "... as a result* he was plainly in no
9position to resist capture.
Karl netting 's six-page article for tfsjMMftftaV*
appearing on February 3* also suffered sons serious inac-
curacies. Fleming mentioned Bucher's upbringing at Boys
Town and continued that he "had gone on from there to
enlist in the navy and subsequently rose through the ranks
to become an officer." * The reporter qualified this
comment by adding parenthetically that aucher had taken
"time out to win a degree in geology at the University of
Nebraska. • However* Fleming then committed the same error
8
£atirfc SMSSUA* Vol. X* p. 104.
*&• Alt** p. 16.
10,,Fttebloi Son't Give Up the Ship—Svar?
February 3* 1969* pp. 24-31.
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George Wilson did* whan he wrote
s
This aede him /3uch«x/ in ?nnapolis parlance a
"mustang* * and mustang officers have traditionally been
regarded as outsiders by Maval Academy graduates like
the five admirals who sat in judgment before hira. 2-2
There simply was no basis in fact for Fleming's
i
which served to give the reader the impression
that some intrinsic conflict existed between Bucher and the
court on the basis of their different schooling and back-
grounds. In fact* Bucher was not a mustang in "traditional
parlance* and even if he were* a good case might be made
for the high amount of respect an officer who has performed
outstandingly enough to earn a direct commission receives
from his contemporaries in commissioned Vaval service.
Later in the article Fleming made en even more
serious error in fact. Be wrote* of the Pueblo's intelli-
gence gathering activities!
• • • while she was nominally a ship of the U. S. Navy*
the Pueblo was in fact operating directly on behalf of
the national Security Agency, a Defense Department
organisation that conducts top-secret electronic
listening and surveillance missions in all parts of the
world* and which is if anything even more cloaked in
security than the Central Intelligence Agency itself.
• . • What this meant in practical terms was that Bucher
had little if any real knowledge of what went on in the
research center of his ship. ... It also meant that*
skipper or not* Bucher could enter this part of the
ship only with the authorisation of the officer in
charge of it* • • • Stephen Harris. 1*
12
13
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While there was little doubt that much of the
Pueblo's collected intelligence data was in response to the
needs of intelligence gathering activities including the
H6>, not one shred of testimony was taken to support
Fleming's claim that the ship was operating "directly on
behalf of the National Security Agency." If he had sources
of information other than the court testimony, these should
have been mentioned. Furthermore » although Fleming was
correct in writing that Bucher had little real knowledge of
the Pueblo's research center's activities , Bucher never
testified that he needed Harris's authorisation to enter
the research spaces, and as has already been pointed out in
earlier analysis, fiucher tacitly admitted he could have
availed himself of necessary information from the research
spaces at any time.
»t another point in the article* Fleming incorrectly
Identified the Pueblo's chief engineer. Gene H. Lacy, as
•James Lacey." 14
The Slsvnnth Sty
Of the few correspondents Who wrote a story to
appear on the day the court resumed open session, Bernard
Weinraub was the only one who told the reader that the
first phase of the court had been completed. As Weinraub
correctly reported, the appearance of the first members of
l4
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the Pueblo crew* Lieutenant Edward R. Murphy and Lieutenant
Stephen a. Harris, laarkod tha beginning of tha second of
the three phases tha court announced at the outset of tha
inquiry. During this second phase a number of the
would appear to relate their personal experiences
in connection with the actual capture of the ship.
Weinraub correctly said of Harris* on the basis of
closed testimony about which the correspondents had been
briefed, that he was emerging as one of tha more dramatic
figures in the case. To amplify this observation* weinraub
reiterated Butcher's testimony that there was a division of
authority between the skipper and Harris and that senior
Naval officers in charge of intelligence activities in the
Pacific area made it known to Bucher that the Pueblo's
16
research personnel were not working for him.
Finally* weinraub introduced Rear fdmiral George L.
Cassell* at the time of the incident the Assistant Chief of
Staff for Operations at Pacific Fleet Command headquarters
(CMCFACFLT) as the first witness who would appear on
February 4 in open court following a morning session in
closed chambers with Harris. For the court* Cassell *s
testimony would introduce the Bevy's reaction to the
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senior cousaands to attempt to send aid to the ship on
January 23* 1968. He was therefore considered an ii&portant
witness. Weinraub correctly identified him as the Deputy
Commander, Naval Striking and Support Forces, Southern
Europe* a nmo command based in Italy which Casseli joined
following his duties at CIlCJMVCFL?.
Earlier* Jack Pox of UPI had announced Cassell*s
forthcoming appearance and misidentifled him and his connec-
tion with the Pueblo capture by reporting* "Also scheduled
to testify . • • is Rear Ads. George I*. Casseli, at the time
commander of 'Strike Force South* in the Japanese comesand




In his report of the eleventh day's proceedings*
Wayne Thomis noted the court's intense interrogation of
Casssll in order to determine why aircraft never were
18launched by units of the Pacific Fleet to aid the Pueblo.
Referring to court president Vice Admiral Harold G. Bowen.
Thomis incorrectly identified him as "Vice Mm* Frank
«19
Both Thomis and Julian Bartt mentioned the crucial
testimony by Cassell that CISCPACFI/r expected the Pueblo to
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rely primarily upon freedom of the high seas as its shield
against mevar* harassment by foreign forces* bat that the
Pueblo was expected to defend itself by "whatever means
available" in the event of an attack. 20
Hartt confused the command to which Cassell was
attached at the time of the incident. CXWCPACFLT. with the
senior military commander in the Pacific* "CX*fC?*€* M or
Commander in Chief* Pacific. 21 »t the time of the incident
that was Admiral u. S. Grant Sharp who would have had to
authorise any action by units of the Pacific fleet to
rescue the ship.
Cassell testified that Admiral Johnson's command in
Japan was responsible for insuring the Pueblo had suffi-
cient equipment on board to handle the destruction of
classified material. 22 This comment tacitly placed at
least a part of the blame for the Pueblo's failure to
complete destruction before capture on the Commander* Naval
Forces Japan (CGKBAVPORJAPAN) * and should have been noted
in reports of Cassell *s testimony. But* Thomis* Weinraub*
and Pox failed to do so.
The UP I report by Fox also mentioned in passing
that Stephen Karris had testified in closed session before
lom, 'fflflfl^irffl SiiMA* February 4* 1969* Sec. I* p. 1.
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Cassell appeared* However* short as the mention was, it
•till contained an error.
Pox wrote* *I*t. Stephen Harris* whose command was
such that not even fiueher could enter his section of the
ship without permission, testified . • •• Ha apparently
this incorrect conclusion on the basis of Butcher's
testimony that he had to knock at the door to the research
spaces on the day of the attack in order to gain entry
24through the triple*locked combination door* However, the
testimony never indicated that Bucher would not be admitted
to the compartment on sight. Moreover* the fact that
Bucher did not know the combination to the door's lock had
no bearing on fox's unwarranted assumption because the
commanding officer would not have a need to enter the space
frequently and keeping him advised of a constantly changed
25
combination would have been an unnecessary administrative
burden.
lfU Day
In his February 4 testimony* Lieutenant Harris
specifically revealed what had already been generally known
23
UmmhJJL flmrisfffrin £&SttAl* February 4* 1969*
Sec. X, p. 4.
24£QU£& BACOC&. Vol. I. p. 120.
General security regulations for navy ships
require the changing of combinations to secure areas on a
free- ~t basis.
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of the great extent to which classified documents had
fallen into the hands of the north Koreans. Most corre-
spondents concentrated their coverage of the day on several
crucial points in the intelligence officer's story. How*
ever* Jim Lucas* coverage appeared to convey the importance
of both Harris* and Lieutenant £dward Murphy's testimony
better than any of the other correspondents* reports.
Lucas correctly said that Harris rebutted Bueher's
claim that he was unwelcome in the research department by
noting that their security clearances were identical, that
Bucher* as commanding officer* could go wherever he wanted
aboard the Pueblo* and that he had no authority to deny
Bucher entrance to the research spaces.
Lucas* however* oversimplified Harris* testimony
regarding the delay his men encountered at the outset of
emergency destruction efforts in the Pueblo's intelligence
section. Lucas wrote* • • . Harris ... has blamed
Bucher for a delay in destruction of the mass of secret
data aboard ship."37 Rather* Harris testified that
Bueher's order to prepare for emergency destruction did not
accompany an order for all hands to go to general quarters
(the movement of all hands to pre~designated positions and
duties in the event of attack or collision). For that
p. 12.
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reason* Harris said, research personnel who were trained to
conduct tha emergency destruction were not in tha compart-
aent to begin tha destruction* and a grant daal of confu-
28
aion and inafficiancy resulted.
Lucas might have said* mora correctly* that
Bucher's action did not take into consideration tha emer-
gency destruction plan of the research detachment, which
was predicated on certain personnel reporting to the
compartment during general quarters, and as a result he was
partially to blame for tha initial failure of the destruc-
tion effort.
Of Murphy's testimony* all tha correspondents
correctly reported his general agreement with Bucher con*
corning tha action of the Pueblo in not resisting capture.
Additionally* all of the coverage noted Murphy's role as
the Pueblo's navigator and his unequivocal statement that
the Pueblo never violated the ttorth Korean's claimed
12-mile territorial boundary.
However* none of the correspondents noted that*
despite the frantic action occurring on the ship during the
attack* Murphy's actions as tha Pueblo's executive officer
eeemed conspicuous by their absence. Thus* after he had
verified the Pueblo's position in international waters in
response to Bucher's demand . Murphy's testimony
Vol. XX* p. 340.
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little personal initiative and action on his part to assist
the commanding officer in his efforts to resolve the
situation in the Pueblo's favor
•
Similarly, in all his previous testimony, Bucher
had not referred to Lieutenant Murphy's assistance or
fulfillment of his duties as executive officer except on a
very few, non-specific occasions. Even a passing familiar-
ity with the particularly close relationship that must
exist between the commanding officer and the executive
officer of a ship for its efficient operation should have
warned the correspondents that this kind of relationship
ssssisd to be lacking between Bucher and Murphy. Instead,
all the correspondents* including those with significant
military experience, mentioned only that Murphy completely
corroborated Bucher 's expressed impression of the Pueblo's
Indefensible position. In fact. Kip Cooper, the corre-
spondent perhaps most experienced militarily, reported that
Murphy said he had a very close relationship with Bucher
29
without adding any disclaimers whatsoever.
Tbji Thirtssnth Bay
On February 5 the remaining three consaissioned
officers of the Pueblo who had not previously testified
told of their experiences before and on the day of the
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ship's capture. Probably the west significant outcome of
the day's testimony was the emergence of points of agree-
sent and disagreement between it and testimony taken
earlier front Bucher and Lieutenant Stephen Harris.
Kip Cooper omitted any mention of the total agree-
ment of the three officers* Lieutenants junior grade
Timothy Harris and Frederick Schumacher and Chief Warrant
Officer Gene Lacy* with Bucher 's contention that surrender-
ing the Pueblo to the North Koreans was the only rational
action to be taken under the circumstances of January 23
,
1968. This was an especially significant error in view of
Cooper's statement early in the article that, "Some of
yesterday's testimony differed from that given by other
em
witnesses, and his numbered listing of the specific
points of disagreement in testimony, also at the outset of
his article.
Similarly, Cooper omitted any mention of the most
specific praise of Commander Bucher by his officers Which
they gave in response to direct questions from the court
asking for an opinion of the command performance of the
Pueblo's skipper* With these omissions. Cooper's report
created an impression of controversy and disagreement
30
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amongst the ship's officers which was not apparent from the
testimony.
On the other hand. Cooper correctly reported sosis
disagreement in testimony which no other correspondent
included in his February 6 report. Pueblo supply officer
Timothy Harris said that weighted bags for thet disposal of
classified publications were available through regular Savy
32
supply channels. while Lieutenant Stephen Harris
said he did not have a sufficient number of bags to conduct
couplets destruction. This he said was partly because he
had to order there custom-made at a very high cost and
because none were available through the Navy's supply
system. Cooper also astutsly pointed out that* on cross
examination by Bucaer's attorney R. Miles Harvey (in behalf
of Lieutenant Stephen Harris), Timothy Karris said the bags
which he knew came aboard in Japan might have been manufac-
tured there rather than having been procured through normal
Navy supply channels. Furthermore* as Cooper reported,
Harvey noted the weighted bags listed in the Federal Supply
Catalog admitted into evidence by the court did not meet
specifications for disposal of documents above a secret
classification, of which there were many in the Fueblo's
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testimony was that Stephen Harris did not attempt to
explain this reasoning, if in fact this was his reasoning*
to the court whan ha testified tha day barer*. This omis-
sion by tha intelligence officar was especially noticeable
in tha light of Harvey's comments* and should have bean
noted by Cooper as a further element of the disagreement
between the two officers' testimony.
Cooper also reported that Omn» t*acy* the ship's
chief engineer* testified the Pueblo could be steered from
the engine room in the event her normal steering controls
in the pilot house malfunctioned. Bucher, to the contrary*
made a rather large issue of the ship's ancient steering
system* the many failures it suffered prior to the Pueblo's
mission* and the crude system of attaching block and tackle
to the rudder post on tha after main deck which would have
to be employed to steer the Ship by hand in an emergency if
main steering were lost.
Although he missed these important points of dis-
agreement along with the other correspondents* Jim Lucas*
report questioned the tactical reasoning Bucher had used in
attempting to evade the north Koreans* and also shrewdly
interpreted the apparent reasoning of the witnesses who
disagreed with each other in testimony.
35
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Lucas asked the rhetorical question* "Why die the
Pueblo stop?** referring to the first tine the ship was
halted by fiucher while still in international waters and
just after the initial gunfire was received from the North
Koreans.34 Lucas explained that, at that time* the ship
was underway and headed out to sea to escape the encircling
and boarding efforts of the four vessels attacking her. He
reiterated Lacy's testimony that damage-control examination!
of the ship "•• • • showed no damage • . • no one had been
injured* . . . no flooding* no damage below the water line
• • /and below deck conditions were/ normal. • . •*J7
Lucas accurately reported that Bueher then stopped the ship,
and turned slowly to follow the North Koreans into port*
because the skipper said he feared for the lives of his
men* and wanted the destruction effort to continue without
the interruption of gunfire or the possible wounding of men
conducting the destruction. Bueher also did not want the
Pueblo disabled and unable to help herself in the event
u. 8. aircraft arrived. *.fter reversing his course* and
following in the wake of the Morth Koreans* Bueher stopped
the ship a second time. Of this Lucas said* "Unaccountably
he decided at one time to stop and make a *personal
3fe
tlSmPh1l £rjum\ ^««^«' February 6. 1969* Sec. X,
P. 2.
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inspection* of too progress of destruction, whereupon the
North Koreans opened fire in esxnest and Firemen Duane
es was killed sad several others wounded.*
Uacas 1 analysis showed the reader the apparent lack
of sound reasoning in Butcher's compliance with the north
Koreans* demand (made by flag signals) to follow in their
wake toward wonsan when the ship had suffered no serious
damage and no crewmen had been injured* Bucher said he
wanted to reach deeper water to permit throwing classified
documents overboard. At the same time, however* he was
trying to present a small target angle to the Koreans by
keeping them directly astern of the Pueblo* This maneuver
had the Pueblo describing s lssy circle in the water as she
turned to the right to avoid the much faster Korean sub-
chaser which was attempting to come alongside. The effect
was to turn the Pueblo in the direction of wonsan. some-
thing Bucher also wished to avoid doing. 80, Bucher stopped
and, predictably, the gunfire did not resume. But, he did
not make an inspection of the destruction efforts at that
time. nonetheless, Bucher testified he then committed him-
self mentally to surrendering the ship if the destruction
of classified materials proved successful. As Lucas
38
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reported by reiterating Buchar's teatinony, the skipper
intended to stall tor time to complete destruction while
heading for Ifonaan* oat this also took him into North
Korean territorial waters and away from deeper water where
destruction would have been more easily and rapidly
accomplished. Lucas stressed the gravity of this crucial
decision by fiucher to follow the North Koreans by quoting
the testimony of Timothy Harris* "Xt was at this point
• . • Harris ... told the court • • . *I felt we had
surrendered the ship**" In fact* the actual boarding of
the Pueblo did not occur for another 40 minutes until the
ship was well within Korean territorial waters. But* as
Lucas implied, the Pueblo was lost as soon as Bucher
complied with the first demand of the North Koreans*
1%is analysis of the events immediately before
capture also permitted Lucas quite logically to write that*
while all witnesses agreed with Bucher that he did not have
the power to resist the North Korean boarding ttn& seisure*
their agreement was limited in that it was •• • « based on
conditions which existed just before the North Koreans
boarded the Pueblo—when she was well within their terri-
torial waters. . . ."41
No correspondent at the court previous to Lucas*
necessary and commendable effort ever sought to analyse
4(W
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Bucher *s tactical reasoning. Yet* the court* In its warning
to Bucher that ha might ba at fault in permitting the
Pueblo to be seised and her personnel to be captured while
he still had the power to resist* strongly suggested that
it found little to praise in Bucher *s handling of the ship
on the day of capture.
Perhaps* if this kind of analysis had been
attempted in press reports shortly after the warning to
Bucher* some of the public indignation over what they
believed was the scapegoating of Bucher by the court could
have been replaced by an understanding of the court's
action against him.
as to Lucas* interpretation of the apparent reason-
ing of the witnesses Who disagreed with each other in their
testimony* Lucas reported* and some spectators to the court
agreed at the time* •• • « each witness ... wants to put
himself in the best possible light. . ."42 However* Lucas
said* the court was no longer willing to accept their
testimony at face value and challenged apparent inconsis-
tencies in the testimony whenever they appeared.
While all the other correspondents pointed out the
close questioning of the witnesses by the court* and the
inherent challenges to their reasoning* they failed to make
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reader was that he might easily have believed the court
badgering its witnesses and seeking ways to indict Bucher
others as well.
Very few errors were committed by the correspondents
in their coverage of the first testimony by enlisted
members of the Pueblo's crew and by one of the two civilian
oesanographers aboard the Pueblo.
Wayne Thostis began his story with Sunnie R. Tack 'a
testimony that his efforts to use oceanographic gear near
the bow of the ship were not impeded on the day of the
attack because icing was not at all severe* and made the
observation that two Pueblo enlisted men testified to only
s light glass of ice. This* Thomis was quick to point out*
contradicted Bucher *s testimony that the Pueblo's guns were
43
virtually unuseabie because of a heavy coating of ice.
In identifying the other crewmen* Thomis incorrectly wrote
that Wendell Leach was a Third Class Signalman* when in




Also* Thomis made no mention in his article of the
praise which Bucher *s men gave him* or their essential
Chifi&tfa XrJUEams* February 7* 1969* See. X* p. 14.
£04£2» BABfiE& Vol. XX* p. 469.






agreement with hi* decision. Therefore* the contradiction
Thomis cited seemed to take on importance that wee not
evident when the day's proceedings were viewed mm a whole*
However* Themis did relate Lee Roy Hayes's eofsaent that
after the Koreans had cone aboard he observed Bucher
uncovering the Pueblo's 90ns at their demand. The ship's
radioman said the skipper appeared to be having trouble
with the gun cover and ice was breaking and flying offt
though he was unsure of its thickness. This somewhat lane
attempt to balance the contradiction also suggested to the
reader that the gun covers could in fact be removed* and
did little to dispell the contrast created by Thostis'
earlier quote of Oceanographer Tuck* that* *'I was working
alone* but it took me no longer than 5 minutes to get the
cover off /my gee*/ and everything rigged for my /Hansen/
cast.*"45
Thomis might more meaningfully have quoted the
testimony of other of the day's witnesses* as did George
Wilson* to show the importance of their testimony to the
issue of the Pueblo's power to resist the North Korean
seisure. Wilson pointed out the important testimony of
Boatswain's Kate First Class Herbert Klepae* 46 who "didn't
want to receive the line'*' the north Koreans tossed to him
TinV itffWi- }r%t- ait.
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as one of their vessels caste alongside the Pueblo to board
her* and the reporter correctly explained that none of
the crew made any attempt* under orders or otherwise* to
resist the boarding. Of this* Wilson correctly wrote
t
The testimony of Klepac and other enlisted men • • • is
crucial to the question of whether • • • Bueher • • •
broke regulations in surrenderins his ship. 48
Jim Lucas made no mention whatsoever of any of the
above noted testimony* His entire article was devoted
instead to what he considered the possible emergence of
Radioman Hayes as ". . . one of the real heroes of the
Pueblo • • • ordeal* • • .
The most important witness to appear on February 7
was Captain John H. D* Williams* a Wavy security specialist
from Wavy Security headquarters in Washington* 0. C. Bis
testimony dealt with the Pueblo's problems with destruction
of classified material* and the issue of alternatives for
destruction which were available to a Wavy ship at the time
of the seizure.
Wo correspondent missed the crucial fact that
Williams testified he believed the classified data aboard
the Pueblo could have been destroyed effectively in one
47
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hour in "... a maximoa all-out effort* ** nor the nota-
tion that Bucher had almoat two hours to do so.
However, Jin Lucas apparently filed his report so
hurriedly after Williams* testimony in the early part of
the day that he failed to note a correction to the expert's
testimony which Williams made expressly for the record and
through the CZB for the press. Originally, Williams said
he estimated 2000 pounds of classified documents were on
the Pueblo* Later he checked his own records and down-
graded that estimate to 600 pounds. Lucas* however,
reported only the first estimate-
Julian Hartt, the UPI correspondent, Robert
Crabbe. 53 and Curtis Sitomer54 all made the same error of
quoting Williams* first estimate.
55
One week later, Tim Tyler's report in Sim showed
the same error. Furthermore, despite the fact that Tyler
had a longer period of time to insure the accuracy of his
50
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reporting* ha incorrectly paraphraaed Captain Williama*
testimony aa followai
An icy. self-assured officer* Williams made it clear
that in his opinion Buchar and Harris had all the
destruction equipment they needed. All that was
Kissing was the ingenuity to do the 30b. And* he
indicated* that task in his view was more important
than saving sailors' lives* 56
However* when ashed by Bueher's attorney* £• Miles
Barvey* if he believed the destruction of classified
Material was wore important than saving human life*
Willlame answered only that **top secret" material which
fell into unfriendly hands posed "an exceptionally grave
threat" to the nation's security. Furthermore. Williams
elaborated* more was involved than one ship and one ship's
crew because eacn *.iip carried vital information about
other ships as well. Finally* he maintained that
measuring classified destruction against the possible loss
of human life was a "judgment" which a commanding officer
would have to make according to the specific circumstances
at hand. 57
Tha Fourth Wsflk
Analytical reports were written by three of the
correspondents during the weekend preceding the opening of
the fourth week of testimony. These were without error and
56
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to show a considerable aaouiit of insight as the
reporters became more and more familiar with their subject.
In addition to a raitoration of old testimony and
court issues. Richard Mayor of the Associated Press antici-
pated the end of the court* a second phase and the beginning
of the third phase of the inquiry* the investigation into
as
the il-month detention of the Pueblo's crew. However* in
that the court would recall previous witnesses
to rslste their experiences during imprisonment. Meyer
failed to inform the reader that the court's attention
would not shift fully to the detention period for at least
a week. Rather* the fourth week would be spent filling in
gaps in capture testimony and resolving any remaining
conflicts in the stories of the Pueblo men*
Ths aut,
The court concentrated its attention on the testi-
mony of four of the Pueblo's enlisted enginemen during the
Opas morning session on the 16th day.
The UPI report of the open court proceedings
incorrectly identified First Claaa jSngineman Rushel
em
Blsnsett mm "The electrician. Rushel C. Blandsett . . •*
* dii 1*& (Wisconsin)
February 10. 1969. Sec. I. p. 11
59,
U February 11. 1969.
Sec. I. p. 13.
m""via.*. fMi^ lo s***fi* i»na»4»i« ••»*
• •-.Art V*,..aM? **£* rSft* MWtf'S <*«»•»• » ***•«>-» *«** *-» -— -»
pal *rfj »• »»*jf«i •'




Ceorge Wilson wrote a thorough article recounting
the testimony of the Pueblo's enginemen. He began hie
report by writing that their testimony marked the end of
the court's investigation into the capture phase* Again.
this announcement was somewhat premature since the court
would take the rest of the fourth week* in closed and open
session* to insure that all relevant testimony about the
capture had been heard.
Wilson insinuated that the inquiry was an adversary
proceeding in the second paragraph of his story when he
wrote
i
As far as attorneys for Cmdr. Lloyd M. Bucher of the
Pueblo is /sic/ concerned $ the defense rests now that
the skipper and crewmen from above and below deck have
given the court their story of the capture. 60
At no point in his article did Wilson add any
disclaimer to this suggestion that Bucher and his attorneys
were in the legal position of defending the Pueblo's
commander from prosecution.
Thm fiavantssnth Pay
The correspondents extensively reported the
February 11 testimony taken from senior enlisted men in the
Pueblo's research detachment entirely in closed hearings.
This comprehensive coverage was based upon an unclassified
release of the testimony made by the CXB at the end of the
o0
Xhm Washington FjQftL* February 11* 1969* Sec. I,
P. 1.
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Although not within the scope of this study* a
brief reiteration of this eovaraga is necassary baeausa of
its Importance to the court's findings about the Pueblo
in" a failure to destroy much of her classified docu-
The testimony of Chief Communication Technician
James Kell, senior enlisted man in the research detachment*
was damaging to Lieutenant Harris* a fact which every
correspondent correctly emphaeised in his report* Kell
testified that he ordered the destruction to begin in the
absence of any order whatsoever from lieutenant Harris*
Moreover* Kell said he never received any direction from
Harris* and the burning of documents ended after 10 or 15
minutes when some person* Kell did not remember who*
ordered it stopped*
Jim Lucas probably best characterised Mali's
opinion of Harris* which the technician gave in response to
a court question* when the reporter wrote that Kell "• . .
dismissed Harris with faint praise as *an average officer
• . • nothing outstanding • • • nothing bad*"*
Furthermore* Lucas implied What many of the corre-
spondents must have wondered about the effect of the
testimony upon Harris* position before the court when the
8l
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Scripps-Howard reporter wrote, The commander of tha
autonomous 'spook' detachment, Lt. Stephen R* Harris.
to have replaced him /Buehax7" in tha "hot seat. **62 Mora
to tha point* Lucas added that* while Buchar had baan warneo
formally ha wight hava to faca court-martial, "la far a* is
known, Harris has not racaivad such a warning*
•
Kail* a testimony was supported by his co-witness of
tha day. Chief Technician Ralph Bouden, and tha day there-
after six sore of the Pueblo's research personnel said
essentially the same things, of Harris' failure to initiate
and direct tha destruction, in closed hearings.
Ths aichtiwrnth flay
The court met in a previously unannounced open
session the afternoon of February 13. In a "clean-up"
session the court questioned Bucher and Kail about their
previous testimony in the light of testimony later taken
from other Pueblo men*
Kip Cooper covered all the important parts of the
testimony, pointing out especially that Buchar insisted the
Pueblo had hoisted a flag signal protesting the north
Korean firing on the Pueblo, and indicating that she was in
international watera* Previously, Signalman Leach had said
he was unable to translate the message "X am in inter-
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therefore had never hoisted that flag aigaai.
Cooper also lietod Bucher's testimony about hla
misgivings of Murphy* a abilities am an executive officer,
something which heretofore had never specifically appeared
in open testimony. Be wrote *
There were many differences of opinion between Bucher*
a submarine officer, and Lt. Edward R. Murphy, a
surface ship officer* the ship's executive officer.
. • • There was a limit to the responsibility Murphy
could be given because of his lack of experience at
sea. Murphy required detailed definitions of Buehsr's
instruction on what was to be done. 6*
Cooper correctly reported that Kell requested to be
permitted to appear before the court again in order to
explain and clarify his previous testimony about the
command ability of Lieutenant Harris. Thus, Kell said that
what he really meant was that he had not known Harris long
enough to give an opinion about hia qualifications. This
Cooper reported. 66
However , Cooper failed to relate the importance of
the Pueblo's sending a flag signal stating she was in
international waters when she was harassed by the North
Korean vessels. The UPI reporter correctly covered this
important reasoning by writing. "Failure to make the
signals would allow the north Koreans to argue the Pueblo
64








had been secretive or hostile.* Furthermore, in his
testimony. Rear Admiral Cassell had reiterated the part of
Bucher's written orders which said he was to protest any
harassment of the Pueblo by first signaling he was in
international waters* thus indicating he had complete free-
doe to Maneuver as he pleased so long as he did not endanger
other ships. 68
Julian Hartt in his report of the day's proceedings
omitted any mention of the differences of opinion between
hoists the Pueblo used.
70Similarly, neither the Associated Press report
rge Wilson's report71 discussed the flag hoist
Jim Lucas failed to mention Bucher's testimony
Murphy
minor differences of opinion between him and
72
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finally, all the correspondents reported that the
court would be In recess on February 14 and over the week-
end to travel to Norfolk, Virginia* to tour the y&& J&Ui
ftajlffh an intelligence ship wltose configuration approxi-
mated that of the ffueblo.
II
I





phase xxx - Dm&mxm
The Fifth
of the San i>i«go based correspondents took a
braak during the weekend the court members traveled to
Jforfoik, Virginia. Hesnwhile, East coast correspondeata
followed the tour of the admirals and counsel for Bucher
and the court as they examined the £B& £aiA ft&Sfih in order
to familiarise themselves first-hand with the actual
configuration of an intelligence collection vessel.
However* Jack fox of the UPX wrote a long analytical
piece which discussed what he believed were the probable
effects of Bucher 's testimony* and the evidence that thus
far had been presented* upon the court's eventual opinion
regarding his having the power to resist the seisure of the
Pueblo by the north Koreans.
Pox's recollection of the day of the crew's release
and the date of the ship's capture were faulty. Be wrotet
The crew walked serosa a snowswept bridge to freedom in
South Korea Dec. 13. They were held captive for 11
months after the Pueblo was seised by north Korean
gunboata Jan. 23* 1967.1
aisfiojoain $fc*fce dousnaJL* February 16* 1969* Sec. X*
p. 3.
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But, testimony toad often ravealoe that the cr«w was
relaa—d on December 23* 1968. at Panrounjora after 11 month*
of imprisonment dating from their capture on January 23.
1963.
Later in the article* rose mentioned toe public's
outrage which toad been expressed to congressmen and ttoe
court in letters describing the navy's attempts to "crucify*
Buctoer. Fox attempted to counter that public position by
writing i
The fact is that Buctoer is being given every possible
opportunity to clear his name and that almost avery
stored of testimony given in public session has been
favorable. Ttoe questions put by ttoe five Annapolis
graduates regarding ttoe "Mustang" commander who rose
from ttoe ranks have been by and large sympathetic. The
criticism so far has been mainly pointed at their own
Havy and its top echelon. 3
The contradiction in fox* a statement is evident
upon clos -• examination and shows his analysis was not
supported by court events or dialog. Thus, if Buctoer were
being given an opportunity to "clear tola name" it would
follow that some evidence presented to ttoe court placed him
in legal jeopardy. That much waa immediately evident when,
on ttoe third day of the proceedings, Buctoer was officially
warned by ttoe court that he was suspected of violating navy
regulations. Article 0730. Such being the case, it also
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"shred of testimony" mad* Bucher a suepeet. In fact* for
the court to take eo irajx>rtant an action, a good deal more
than a ehred of testimony would have to have been
preaented
.
At the leaat. Fox* a reasoning presupposed the
thinking and final recommendations of the court—that
Bucher could not be considered culpable in the loss of the
Pueblo based upon the evidence before the court. This
seems similar to a journalist predicting in his reports,
based upon his opinion of the testimony, that a defendant
in a punitive proceeding will probably be found innocent of
the charges against him. Thus, if the reader were to
believe Pox, an eventual recommendation by the court
unfavorable to Sucher was almost out of the question.
In his second comment. Fox apparently borrowed the
faulty analogy made by George Wilson in an earlier article.
To reiterate the criticism of that analogy, Bucher did not
rise from the enlisted ranks to become a commissioned
officer and eventually a Wavy commander—the traditional
definition of a mustang. Rather, he completed a tour of
enlisted service, left the Wavy, attended college, and
reentered the service through the Reserve Officer Training
Corps (ROTC) as a commissioned officer. Furthermore, the
implication that "Annapolis graduates and a "^tustang*
commander * are somehow intrinsically different has no
4
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Fax's article probably should have been labeled as
a news analysis or as an opinion* a matter which way not
have been apparent to the reader.
The UPI reporter also omitted mention of the court's
beginning the third phase of its inquiry* an omission which
may have obstructed the reader's ability to understand that
the court was shifting its attention to the crew's 11-month
detention.
Julian Hartt also omitted any mention of the start
of the third phase in a story which appeared on the day the
court resumed open testimony. His article analysed the
Navy legend that its chief petty officers* the highest
enlisted rank in the Naval service* "run the Navy" by
virtue of their experience and technical proficiency. In
writing about the *unmistakable mutual respect between the
gold-braided five (the court members) * near the top
commissioned rank* and the chief petty officers (of the
Pueblo) • holding the highest non-commissioned rank* Hartt
oversealously included Chief Warrant Officer Gene Lacy* the
Pueblo's chief engineer* amongst the chief petty officers.
The rank of chief warrant officer Which Lacy held was a
.ssioned rank.
P. 3.
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lieutenant Edward R. Murphy was tha only witness to
appear in open court on February 17. The important issues
in his testimony were his comments concerning his differ*
eases of opinion with Bucher. his estimation of the applic-
ability of the Code of Conduct to the Pueblo crewmen's
situation* and his admission that he had in fact violated
the tenets of the code in his behavior while in captivity.
Richard Meyer of the Associated Press made no
tion whatsoever of the testimony regarding the differ-
s of opinion between Bucher and Murphy, the Pueblo's
executive officer* Briefly. Murphy had agreed with
Bucher 's earlier testimony that these differences were
"occasional professional differences of opinion" created
of "different backgrounds'1 and were "easily settled
8
raptaln deciding after X made my recommendations."
Wayne Tborais also failed to mention Murphy's
testimony concerning his minor differences of opinion with
g
Bucher. and omitted the executive officer's estimation
that the code had only limited applications
p. 4B.
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X think that the underlying principle—loyalty to one's
government (does apply). . • • however • • • the state
of the art has changed ... we now have a psychologi-
cal warfare environment and I think that the Code of
Conduct does not apply itself well in that environ-
ment. 10
Similarly, George Wilson, in an otherwise accurate
article, failed to mention Murphy's testimony about his
differences of opinion with Bucher.
Kip Cooper missed most of the important issues in
the testimony in his article. 12 Be failed to bring out
Murphy's estimation of the inapplicability of the code, or
of his differences of opinion with Suchar. Be also failed
to inform the reader that the court had entered the third
phase of its investigation. Cooper did, however, minutely
detail the actual incidents of brutality and the atmosphere
of captivity revealed by Murphy's testimony Which resulted
in his breaking the tenets of the code.
Robert Crabbe, the UFI correspondent, also failed
to mention the testimony regarding differences of opinion
between the two Pueblo officers, and did not inform the
reader that the third phase of the inquiry had begun.
10
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In contrast* Barnard »oinr«ub*s article was acre
thorough and accurate. Ms showed the reader the impor-
tance of the differences of opinion between Bucher and
Murphy especially well*
During his four hours of testimony » • • Murphy faced
the assistant counsel . . . and the five admirals
sitting nearby but rarely turned to Commander Bucher.
who sat four feet away fro© the executive officer.
... Bucher said last Thursday that he had had
"differences of opinion" with ... Murphy "because of
his limited experience** and the different backgrounds
of the skipper and the executive officer. 15
However, weinraub then incorrectly described
as a "former enlisted man who rose through the ranks'* and
spent years in submarine training, and thereby made an
effort to contrast this background with Murphy's entering
the surface ship forces after attending naval Officer
Candidate School (OCS) in Rhode Island. Save for a
possible difference in viewpoints between a submarine
officer and a surface officer, there is no substantive
basis for a contrast between Bucher* an ftOTC trained
officer, and Murphy, an OCS graduate.
Jim Lucas, in his report, related Murphy's testi-
mony about the crew's attempt to build a crystal radio set
while in captivity, and the instrumentality of Lee Roy
ayes in this effort. However, Lucas incorrectly
i4
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identified the Second Clans Radioman* Hayes* as a
signalman.
Lucas also failed to inform the reader of the start
of the third phase of the inquiry* but in a very concise
way he notified the reader of the apparent differences of
opinion between Bucher and Murphy!
Murphy spoke well of Bucher* but not as glowingly as
other crewmen have. Xt has become obvious there were
strained feelings between Bucher and his Ho. 2 raan.i?
In fact* despite the efforts of E. Miles Harvey to
extract from Murphy some eye-witness testimony of Bucher *s
efforts to mock the north Koreans during captivity* the
executive officer effectively subverted any attempt to do
so. Furthermore* When asked by Harvey for his opinion of
Bucher *s performance and leadership during captivity*
Murphy said only* "I think under the circumstances he did
his job as well as any other commanding officer could be
expected to do."18
Curtis Sitomer omitted any mention of Murphy's
testimony regarding his differences of opinion with Bucher*
Be also failed to relate Murphy's estimation of the limited
applicability of the code to a psychological warfare
environment. Moreover* in reference to the amount of
p. 11.
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classified documents the Pueblo was carrying, Sitomer
referred to Captain Williams* testimony of "2000 pounds."
19
not to his later corrected estimate of 600 pounds.
tntiath feay
Open court testimony on February 18 occurred only
during the afternoon session* and included testimony fry the
Pueblo's operation officer . Lieutenant Frederick Schumacher,
and her supply officer. Lieutenant junior grade Timothy
Harris.
The most important comments included Schumacher's
testimony that the initial departure from the Geneva
Convention by all the Pueblo officers took place the day
sfter their capture. each, he said, freely admitted his
job on the ship to lend credence to the cover story that
the Pueblo was conducting oceanographic and electro**
magnetic research* and therefore departed from the Geneva
Convention and the Code of Conduct by giving more than
name. rank, serial number and date of birth. Furthermore.
Schumacher said he eventually complied with Korth Korean
demands for a confession after being beaten severely, after
seeing tnat the north Koreans held a complete copy of the
Pueblo's mission report, and after deciding they eould
p. 5.
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extract frou* hiss any confession they so desired.
Squally important wee Schumacher • a estimate that
the code could not really be applied to the Pueblo men
becauae they were captured with their command atn6 all its
classified records virtually intact.
Very few errors wara committed by the correspond-
ents in their coverage of the day's proceedings. Generally,
reports concentrated on Schumacher *s testimony because hi.m
comments were in the majority, as Harris had just begun
testifying when the court recessed for the day.
Jim Lucas made the only significant error when he
incorrectly reported that* "Of all the captured crewmen*
Schumacher broke first." Rather* as had frequently been
testified to in earlier testimony* the tSorth Koreans
concentrated on and succeeded in extracting a confession
from Bttcher just shortly before succeeding with Schumacher.
At a later point in the article Lucas incorrectly
attributed a court question of Schumacher about what he
considered to be the greatest psychological pressure he
endured during captivity. Although Lucas said Admiral
Bowen had asked the question* in fact* court counsel
Captain Hewsome asked the question to which Schumacher
Sec. X* p. 14.
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Timothy Harris returned to the stand on February 19
and proceeded to vividly describe his hatred for his
captors* his suicide attest* and his departure frees the
Code of Conduct after severe beatings and after having been
shown Pueblo documents which included most of the informa-
tion his captors demanded he admit to in a signed
confession. Gene Lacy followed Harris to the witness chair
and expressed the doubts* which apparently many of the
crewmen had* that the Geneva Convention and the Code of
Conduct completely applied to their case since the United
States and ttorth Korea were not at war. Be was followed by
Lieutenant Stephen Harris who revealed* along with Lacy*
that one reason for the Pueblo officers agreeing to sign
confessions waa in the hope that it would satisfy the north
Koreans and prevent a concerted attempt to discover secret
information concerning the intelligence activities many of
the Pueblo men had been connected with apart from their
last mission on the Pueblo. In addition* Harris expressed
genuine surprise that the north Koreans never seemed to
realise the importance of his position as the chief intel-
ligence officer on the Pueblo* nor the gravity of the
23
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information contains© in confiscated a*crat documents which
thay showed him. Therefore, ha said, he readily agreed to
the relatively low-level of sanaitive information the north
Koreans included in written confessions, while attempting
to include spurious information such aa his reporting to
"Maxwell Smart" (a television character)* in order to
protect far sore important information.
All of the correspondents reporting the half-day of
open testimony included these important elements in their
copy and made no significant errors.
tndJBm?
What had already been discussed by the Pueblo
officers the day before was elaborated upon in testimony by
five senior enlisted Pueblo crew members on February 20.
While their comments covered the entirety of the 11 months
of imprisonment* the primary points of their testimony waret
the fear of death and futility of withstanding endless
torture which eaueed the men to depart from the code and
make confessions and write letters to the President and
other influential Americans asking for a U. S. apology to
North Korea; their efforte to Include hidden meseagee to
the outside world in letters and confessions thay were
forced to write j the command structure which held the men
together* under the direction of Sucher* throughout the
24
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imprisonment; and the Almost unbelievable brutality which
the Koreans taeted out to accomplish their ends. Zn partic-
ular, Charles Law testified he was convinced the code could
not apply to the Pueblo crew, captured with its records and
the service records of the crewmen virtually intact* as it
would to a foot soldier captured in the field with only his
pack and dog tags. 25
Without exception the correspondents concentrated
their reports upon the reasoning behind each man's departure
from the tenets of the code* the crew's desire* to a man*
for armed retaliation by the United States against north
Korea despite the probable loss of their own lives* mod the
torture each man had endured.
Probably* the mood of the correspondents after hour
upon hour of vivid tales of torture was best expressed by
Jim Lucas in his report of the day's testimony*
In the end* the North Koreans also broke under the
strain* reduced to impotent rage by the Americans they
had forced to grovel before then. All along, their
north Korean captors learned toward the end, the
Americans had been laughing at then, lying to them,
parodying them, aping them, messing up their propaganda
pictures with obscene gestures. So* during a fiendish
"hell week" in which Hayes* jaw was broken and every
man among them beaten unmercifully, the enemy tried to
pay them back. Finally, they sent them home* this band
of young Americans who could not—legally
—
quit«
deliver what their country asked of them, but who clung
to each other and survived .26
p. 15
25Cauxt Eacanl* vol. XV* pp. 815-888.
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The similarity of the testimony and the etaotional
involvement of many of the correspondents appeared to have
played an important part in the laudable accuracy with
which they reported the day's testimony, two-thirds of
which was in open session.
At this point in the proceedings Wayne Thomis, the
Tribal correspondent, believed that, "For all
practical purposes the inquiry was over by February 21,
1969," and therefore returned to his Chicago office.
Thereafter, the Trihup reported the last two weeks of the
court only infrequently with AP and UP I stories.
At the end of the day's proceedings the court
recessed, in honor of Washington's Birthday, to resume
testimony on February 24.
Thfi Sixth
Shortly after the recess was called on February 20,
Captain William Mewsome called a surprise news conference
at the Pueblo CIB. He announced the court's latest inten-
tion to call evary crewmember to testify before the court.
The announcement met with some amassment on the part of the
correspondents in view of the court counsel's estimate, at
the outset of the inquiry, that only those members of the
crew whose experiences had a direct bearing on the capture
and important elements of the period of imprisonment would
27Letter to the author dated Hoves&er 19, 1970.
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bo called to give testimony.
Most of the long-weekend news reports discussed
this latest procedural change by the court. But, George
Wilson wrote the most thorough report of Wewsome's press
conference and made an attempt to interpret the reasons for
the change* Wilson opened his story with a succinct para-
phrase of Kewsome's comments:
The Wavy, in a reversal of opinion, has decided the
American fighting man's code of conduct applies to the
Pueblo crewmen after all* 28
The application, as Hewsome announced and Wilson
reported, would not be from a punitive standpoint since
Mewsome believed the code, "... like the Ten Commandment a,
could be violated "spiritually" but not "punitively .
*
2*
Wilson did a superb job of measuring Bawsome's
comments against the questions asked by the court of each
of the witnesses during the previous week of the detention
phase. The court, Wilson explained, seemed concerned with
the previous training each Pueblo man had had in the code
and its application to his military life, how each inter-
preted the code in his own mind, and what had brought him
30to violate the code during his captivity.
Washingtan £»a&, February 22, 1969, Sec. X,
p. A4.
29
* Opinion expressed by Captain William ft. tiewsome,
JMC. US**, in a press conference at the Naval ^nphibious
Base, Coronado, California, February 20, 1969.
30
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Against this surmise, Wilson played xewsome's
aonimti that tho Pueblo inquiry served as an excellent
vehicle for appraising the coda and recommending changes to
it, if any. But Wilson in his report also recalled
Kewsome's opinion expressed on January 19s
• . . the Code of Conduct is inapplicable in this
present situation. We have had an opinion that the
crew members on the Pueblo were not prisoners of war;
they were illegally detained. • • . when we don't have
prisoners of war, we don't have the application of the
Code of Conduct. . • - 3l
That opinion, awmoms explained on January 13, had
cone from the Bevy's judge advocate general, a fact which
Wilson noted in his February 22 story. Against this Wilson
quoted Wewsotne's relevant comments of February 20s
Zt has become obvious that the Code of Conduct is
applicable in this situation. First of all, because
the understanding of the people themselves, and second
of all, because of certain things which transpired
aboard the ship at the tine of its capture. • • . One
of the tasks of the court is to examine that code and
see whether or not it meets our present needs. ... X
think we have an excellent vehicle for doing that right
Of this change of court position, Wilson reported
t
would not say who or what reversed his
earlier opinion that the code did not apply to the
Pueblo men. ... /Ha/ does not set policy for the
Court of Inquiry but acts as its hired legal hand.
Vice Ate. Harold 0. Bowen, Jr., president of the court,
and his four fellow admirals on the court obviously
to focus on the code.
Wilson's assumption that Vice Admiral Bowen and his
Opinion expressed by Captain William R«
dSL- cit.t January 13, 1969.
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fellow court members had **. . . obviously decided to focus
on the code" and hie inference that the admiral a had
reached the decision totally on their own advisement was in
error. In fact* the court had changed its position with
regard to the code in response to directions from Havy JAG
officials in Washington.
Havsona's reasoning, no doubt, was a reflection of
the reasoning Havy JAG had used to reach its latest opinion.
As Wilson reported, the situation on board the Pueblo to
which Newsorae referred was the warning to her crewmen,
announced by Chief Warrant Officer Lacy over the ship's
loudspeaker, that they should give only their name, rank,
serial number and date of birth to the Morth Koreans. This
warning just before capture, coupled with the crewaaen's
understanding of the code tm expressed to the court, mads
the admittedly moral guide a real factor in the Pueblo
men's thinking during their captivity. On this basis,
apparently, Kavy JAG considered the code to be in effect
even though North Korea and the United States were not at
war.
This consideration was well illustrated by Robert
Crabbe of the UP! in his analysis of Kowsome's press
conferences
• • . Hewsome indicated Thursday that the code issued
in 1955 was a "moral statement" and that as such was
binding on the crewmen. 32
22
*XMZsmmXn SLtftla. Jjaurnal, February 22, 1969,
Sec. Z, p. 12.
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Crabbe went on to quote Huwioni ae follows?
aZ do believe that as a moral coda* the members of the
Pueblo 'a craw n*ive indicated they felt they were bound
by it. • • • The court will have to judge whether they
violated it of their own free will. "33
Another important consideration which weighed in
the aiiida of military official* waa the possibly detri-
mental effect of declaring the code inapplicable to the
Pueblo men becauee north Korea and the United States were
not at war, while other American men were still prisoners
in North Vietnam—a country we were not officially at war
with either. Those who saw the similarity between the
Pueblo men and the American prisoners in North Vietnam
suggested the North Vietnamese would capitalise on the
declaration of the code's inapplicability to non-PQMs.
This, the proponents of applying the code in the Pueblo
circumstance argued, undoubtedly would be made known to the
Americana by their Worth Vietnamese captora. The result,
it was believed by many, would be the rapid deterioration
of morale and the loas of the moral basia of the code which
might be sustaining the American prisoners in north Vietnam.
None of the correapondenta mentioned thin consider-
ation. Similarly, none of the correapondenta surmised In
their reports that thia most significant shift in the
court's application of the code to the Pueblo men was due
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correspondent*, only Crabbc and Wilson devoted a story to
Hawsoma 's announcement and provided the reader with an




During four open days of testimony in the sixth
ik of court hearings* 34 enlisted Pueblo crewmen and one
of her civilian oceanographere appeared to testify. The
reason for their appearances* aside from the fact that the
court wished to examine each man* a specific reasons for his
interpretation of the Code of Conduct and whether or not he
believed he departed from it during captivity* was as
Captain Mswsoma put it. to allow each man to tell his own
story if that was his desire.*4
To determine that desire and to meet the needs of
the inquiry* mswsoma interviewed each crewman privately
before each session began in order to decide if the man*s
desire to testify was warranted and if his experiences
would add any new information to that which the court had
already ascertained. Privately* the court also wanted to
insure that no Pueblo orewmember* after the proceedings
were completed* would be able to say he was not given an
34Opinion expressed by Captain xetwsome* Xobl. cJLfc.
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opportunity to tell his story*
The similarity of testimony by each of the man etna
the familiarity tho correspondents had gained from earlier
witnesses presumably prevented many errors from appearing
in the reporters' copy* In general , the reports Were
filled with the agony and torture each man had endured
during his captivity.
Julian Hartt, however* broke perhaps the most
interesting story of the week in a February 25 dispatch.
From earlier testimony by Bucher, Bartt noted that, when
asked if he believed the North Korean attack by two sub*
chasers, four PT boats and two Mia aircraft was controlled
and coordinated by one commander, Bucher had replied in the
affirmative. Armed with this previous testimony, and the
copies of the Pueblo messages received in Japan before the
ship was boarded which had been distributed to the corre-
spondents by the CIB, Bartt drew some interesting and
correct conclusions. The messages showed that the Pueblo
was anticipating certain of the north Korean actions. Thus,
the Pueblo radioed Japan, "They plan to open fire on us
now, " and "We are going to be boarded now, M before either
of these events actually occurred. Bartt added this infer-*
mation to the testimony by Bucher that he had two inter-
preters aboard who were tuned into the Koreans' tactical
o
5This reasoning was expressed to the author by one
f the court officials during the proceedings.
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radio circuits to intercept any transmissions relating to
the Fueblo. As ftsrtt correctly reported, Bucher's open
court testirony in this area was cut short by Kawsosui on
the advice of a security advisor seated beside hin.
Furtherraor** Hartt reported he was unable to learn who were
the two interpreters*
Xip Cooper, in a February 26 report of the 23rd day
of testimony* incorrectly attributed a statement hy one of
the crewman that he had declared to a Morth Korean officer
how outdated the Communist Manifesto being used to indoc-
trinate the Pueblo sen appeared. Cooper said this testi-
mony was proffered by Rushel Dlancet t. when in fact
Coaaeonications Technician Donald R. Feppard had aade the
statement. 38
On February 26* the £cripps~Boward correspondent*
Jim Lucas * collapsed in the courtroom during the proceed-
ings. Be was taken by ambulance to a local hospital and
did not resume coverage of the Inquiry until March 2.
Robert Crabbe* in a February 27 UP! dispatch* had
occasion to refer to earlier testimony by the Pueblo's
•apply officer* Lieutenant junior grade Timothy Harris* in
reporting those of the ship who had attempted suicide
9.
36
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during captivity* However* Crabbe Incorrectly identified
3'
the supply officer ae Timothy Harrison.
In a February 28 report Curtis Sxtomer reassessed
the questions before the court which he believed still were
not satisfactorily resolved by testimony. One of these* he
wrote* was whether the Pueblo crew had done all it could to
destroy classified material before capture. Referring to
Captain Williams * testimony about a theoretical all-out
maximum effort* Sitomer reported Williams had maintained
the crew could •« • • jettison and destroy her ton of
40
classified cargo in an hour.* However* as already noted*
Williams later the same day downgraded his estimate of the
Pueblo's classified document allowance to 600 pounds.
On the same day* Hartt reiterated from testimony
the Pueblo men's experiences during September 1968 during
captivity when they were ushered by guards* one at a time*
to the "Gypsy Tea Room* a plain room in the prison
compound so-named by the crewmen. There they were offered
good food and alcoholic beverages and interviewed by North
Korean civilians who apparently were attempting to
proselytise them to Korean communism. Though most of the
testimony centered around questions asxec of them by north
Korean men dressed in civilian clothing* Hartt over-
* AppfiAl* Sec. X* p. 29.
See. I* p. 12.
40ChgUUsn figlanCfl tfflnifca** February 23* 19&9*
:.^r.«8 \tt30#uT ft* *•?
.-.*• Jtov»Ai»4 a* ffekirfv ttfteo *rf* **«&*& «*c*;ft<Nip arf*
aori^ So ft*9 .^a© d texrXo*** xl************ ***
0ttittuk*ii .***:*¥>» ****** 4ftJt%a9ftfl »*l*.U»*io vo^oea
.X«MHMMfi» ft JMKll fWfti^H^ **«*
i had mmUSMM W^mMjfts wwntU ,;mft*» mmUmm
*©* x*tt 'ion?*»u btm «ft***£«»c . .
.vwmwi ^ftftftal* ft* .*«*•>«*> -uftrf n» aA ov**a hmXXk—al*
i fcfttatfBWftfe tft^» **** «*** *ft*»X •**
4ftj«K <-j «* afawwlf MflM .-.•->:-=>--.,;.- ft* Um0
if>H .*ft5 «•»•
;»q**i ft'Aft* •X4»0* ft**
,**| JWiftHftft ***** tfft*£s J«a»o
.*!©©* ftft* VMJV^* «« ft*
. Jmftftft^qi **b* wftJIivx© ***«fta
113
dramatised several alight references to Korean women who
were in the room to serve the food and drinks* Thus
Hartt's lead paragraphs reads
It was disclosed . . . for the first time that kiaaono-
clad Korean girls were esf>loyed in the "gypsy tea room"
where OSS Pueblo crewmen were taken one at a time in an
attempt to proselyte them. Testimony . . . indicated
the girls only served cookies* candy* beer and a rice
liquor, and did not offer themselves.^
Hartt's enjoinder that the "girls," who according to testi-
mony were not at all young or pretty to look at, did not
prostitute themselves before the men probably did little to
dispel the sensational effect upon the reader of the lead
or the headline, "'Gypsy Tea Room' Girls Served Pueblo
Men."43 Similarly, the slugline above the headline,
•CooXlaa, Csju&U* Afld ftsjejr. in smaller, less-prominent
type face* did not erase the innuendo within the headline.
Furthermore, the loose, wide-sleeved, floor-length
kimono is indigenous to Japan, not to Worth Korea. The
contrast between Hartt's description of the women and
Bernard Weinraub's description is obvious upon comparison.
Women in shoulder"to*ankle dresses sometimes offered
cookies, beer and wine. ... Two or three Korean
civilians stood beside the American(s) and asked
questions. 43
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Moreover, Welnreub's description speared deep
within his copy, which was hoadHoed nor* sensibly and
accurately, "Pueblo Crewman Recount North Korean Attempts
to Probe and Befriend Them in 'Gypsy Tea Room. •*44
Again, daring the seventh weak, four days of open
testimony were taken by the court. Witnesses included 12
More enlisted crewmen, the remaining civilian oceanographer,
and a Wavy legal expert in international law.
Weekend news reports by the correspondents were few
in number. Those which appeared on March 1 discussed the
27th day of testimony without significant error, and in
passing most mentioned that about two weeks remained before
the inquiry would conclude the taking of testimony.
On March 2 an article by George Wilson appeared
which expanded upon Julian Bartt'a report regarding the
Morean-language interpreters aboard the Pueblo. Wilson
correctly determined from the open-court evidence that the
ship's research detachment was better geared to handling
Russian Intelligence gathering, and rather poorly adapted
and prepared to eavesdrop on Worth Korean activities. In
fact, as Wilson pointed out, the Pueblo's two-part mission
plan made the monitoring of Russian naval unit activity in
the Tsushima Straits s more important element of the ship's
'jfeM.
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final mission than her activities along the north Korean
coast* Also* drawing upon an unidentified source of infor-
mation* Wilson correctly named the two Marine corps
sergeants in the research attachment as the Korean*language
interpreters* However , he incorrectly named Sergeant
Robert Hammond as Sergeant Meson st several points in the
article, 45
Bernard Weinraub also reiterated previous testimony
before the court to show that* as his article maintained,
the Pueblo *s main task was to survey the Russians*
activities. The important point in Weinraub *s story, ss in
Wilson's report, was that the lack of preparedness of the
research group for North Korean eavesdropping contributed
46to the Pueblo's unpreparedness for the eventual attack.
However, Wilson better substantiated this claim by informing
the reader correctly that the Pueblo's interpreters were
barely fluent in Korean, and therefore probably could not
translate any intercepted tactical messages quickly enough
to be of great use to Buoher during the attack. As Wilson




But Weinraub compounded his error at another point
43
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in the article by writing*
Since most of the crewmen were unaware of the ship*
a
intelligence mission—they had only been told that the
Pueblo waa engaged in "oceanographic research*—there
appeara to have been considerable confusion in the
feverish efforte to burn and scuttle the 600 pounds of
secret papers on the ship. 4*
In fact* the great majority of the crewmen given
the task of destroying classified doeursents were research
personnel. Seen of these men knew exactly what the
Pueblo* a mission involved since they were the personnel
responsible for the gathering of intelligence information.
Those few of the Pueblo's navigational, communications and
administrative personnel who assisted in the attempted
destruction* while not privy to the exact nature of the
Pueblo's mission, were only assisting destruction from
outside the research compartments • Thus, they were
receiving bags of classified material and feeding waste**
basket fires with documents received from the technicians
within the compartment. Weinraub should have recalled
these facts which were frequently revealed in open-court
testimony, because they clearly showed that a lack of
knowledge on the part of the Pueblo 'a deck-force personnel
could not have contributed to confusion on the part of the
informed personnel directing the attested destruction.
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-jreat surprise* occurred in any of the testimony
of the seventh week. In reporting the reiteration of
already known facts and events by the witnesses* the corre-
spondents made no significant errors* Furthermore, all the
reporters handled the testimony by Captain John R. Brock,
regarding fforth Korea's violation of international laws of
the high seas in seising the Pueblo* in an accurate manner.
atteMfcjBVfc
Curing the weekend preceding the eighth and final
week of hearings, the court members traveled to Hawaii to
confer with the authority who had convened the court.
Admiral John J. Byland, then Commander of the Kavy's
Pacific Fleet.
Mews reports anticipating the last week of hearings
drew upon a short announcement by court president* Vice
Admiral Bowen* that former Military Armistice Commission
(Fanaunjoa) negotiator* Vice Admiral John Victor Smith*
would testify on March 10. Bowen also announced* and the
press generally reported* that Bucher would return to the
stand in a final appearance at his own request. Further-
more* it was announced that one of Bucher*s former
commanding officers* Commander Peter Block, would be called
to testify as a witness for the Pueblo skipper following
Bucher's last statements to the court.
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Jul*an Hartt mentioned all of these procedural
details in his report appearing March 8. At the same time,
ha briefly surveyed the teatimony taken by the court in
closeu session on March 7. One of the witnesses at thst
session* Hartt correctly reported* was Captain John Stran©,
the head of the Navy's ftg&E (Survival, Evasion. Resistance,
Escape) Training program. Although Hartt did not report
it, Strana discussed the training program, designed to
prepare Mavy personnel for possible capture by an enemy
force, and its relation to the situations the Pueblo men
faced during their imprisonment. Hartt mentioned the
training program in passing sad then wrote that it was one
49
which none of the Pueblo crewmen apparently had.**
However, he had previously reported the testimony of
Communications Technician Don £. Bailey on February 36,
and while Hartt did not include it in his report at that
time, Bailey gave a considerable amount of testimony
regarding the 8SSIB training he had received and how it had
helped him during his captivity*
Another witness appearing in the March 7 closed
session was Communications Technician Angelo Strano. His
comments were reported by Bernard MeinXBub from an
unclassified summary released by the CZB. While otherwise
49la* ft*>»»**»« times, March 8, 1969, Sec. XI, p. 1
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accurate, Weinraub's report at one point referred to Patty
Officer Strano as Private Strano.
Tha Thirty-third Through tha
Thirty- fourth frays
All of the correspondents accurately described the
testimony of Admiral Smith who appeared in the rooming
session of the 33rd day. Called by ft* Miles Harvey*
Admiral Smith related his feelings and experiences as chief
negotiator at Fanmunjom in attempting to secure the release
of the Pueblo crew during the two months he served there
after her capture and before being reassigned as Commander
of the Pacific Amphibious forces.
following Admiral Smith* Commander Block testified
in Bucher 's behalf. Bis testimony was accurately reported
by the correspondents.
Daring the afternoon session of March 10* Bucher
began his final remarks to the court. Among his comments
Bucher specifically praised most of his crewmen* singling
them out by name for their bravery and valor or for their
constant efforts to befuddle and confuse the north Koreans.
Of these remarks* only Barnard ffainraub reported the
significant absence of Lieutenant Murphy's name from either
of the lists which Bucher read. Heinraub further correctly
noted the obviouaness of this fact to those in the
*Xha Matt X&rjk Xiaam* March 8. 1969* Sac. X* p. 13.
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courtroom by also reporting that Lieutenant Stephen Harris*
nan did appear on one list, even though he and Bucher had
nan dieagreomente in the use of the research personnel for
ship exercises.
On March 11. the 34th day of testimony recorded by
the court. Bucher continued his final statement to the
admirals. Interspersed with his comments and following his
resarks, the court recalled numerous areas which had
previously been revealed by questions as a matter of
interest to the court. The questions asked on March 11.
sometimes in contrast to other sessions, were sharp and to
the point. Bowever. Robert Crabbe of the Ufl overdramatised
the criapnees of the questions in his report of the day's
proceedings When he wrote
t
Five sdmirale who could recommend a court-martial for
. • • Lloyd Bucher berraged hie Tuesday with hostile
questions about losing his ship without a fight. 53
Most of the correspondents referred to the direct**
ness of the court's questions to Bucher. but none reported
them to be hostile.
On March 12 the court was in open session only long
enough to take testimony from Captain Albert Giorgis of the
ttavy*s Ship Systems Command whose comments centered around
52Zha sex Xosfc XiamJU March 11. 1969, Sec. X.
p. 13.
p. 5.
53Xhm Milwaukee OquxmlU March 12. 1969* Sac. I,
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his estimate that the Pueblo could have been scuttled in
shout an hour by a properly trained crew. However* he also
noted that studies were not initiated to determine this
until after the Pueblo had been seised. 54
Curtis Sitoner filed reports covering the open
sessions of the eighth week* and in each referred to the
fact that the court was still concerned with the Pueblo's
attempts to conduct emergency destruction. In reporting
this concern* Sitoner commented incorrectly without excep-
tion in each report that the Pueblo had an estimated "2000
pounds" of classified documents.
On March 13* following remarks by Commander Bucher
Smd a closing statement by his attorney* fU Miles Harvey,
the court wss closed by its president* Vice Admiral
Harold 0. Bowen* Jr.* at 9*55 in the morning.
Reports of the court's last open session were
completely accurate.
54
Cjaatt &8CO£d« Vol. VIII* pp. 1847-1855.
SSChrUU«n Science mnxtsui. March 13* 1565,
Sec. X, p. 7* and March 14* 1969* Sec. I, p. 14.
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The effort to measure the emphasis the correspond-
enta placed upon particular court events and teaticaony in
each day* a coverage of the inquiry utilised 311 of the 333
news atoriea and eight of the eleven publication* included
in thia etudy. within thie field of data, nine of the 12
correspondenta appeared*
tasluded from the measurement of emphasis wars the
five ls*MIBftJfc sad four Tiiaa articles which wars published
during the period the court was in session* These were
considered to he too few in number and too inclusive in
content to compare accurately with corresponding newspaper
reports of the aame dates*
furthermore, the reports of the UPX correspondents.
Jack Pox and Robert Crabbe, ware not specifically identi-
fied by author. Rather, the total UPX effort has been
identified in Table 1 only by wire service name* It was
established by separate correspondence that Fox reported
the court from its beginning until February 16, when he was
replaced by Crabbe, who covered the remaining sessions of
122
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the court. However, In each reporter's cats, the number
of stories in which esch participated individually was too
small to yield accurate measurement.
While the other news stories in the measurement
were also identified only by wire service or publication
name* in every case the news reports by the member corre*
spondent selected for this study were the only ones used.
Wayne Themis of the Chicago. 2&ttuua& was also
excluded from the listings in Table 1 after it was deter-
mined that he had participated in only 13 news days in
which a consensus appeared* Even though Thomis was with
the consensus lead on each of the 13 aays, his total
participation was considered too small, when measured
against the other correspondents, to be included in the
measurement.
The 311 news stories were first categorised by date
and publication. Next* each story's lead paragraph was
analysed and a brief statement of the factual content
therein was extracted and listed in columnar fashion with
the date of the story under the publication or wire service
name. Then the author compared each summarised lead for a
given date to determine if a majority of the correspondents
.
that is* five or more of the reporters* chose the same
XLetter to the author from Robert Crabbe, dated
r 29, 1970.
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general factual content with which to laad their story.
Thus, the determination of a lead item was made solely on
the basis of the correspondent's selection of factual
content taken from the court's proceedings* or strictly
related events* and contained in the first paragraph of his
story. On occasion* in the case of interpretive leads* the
author found it necessary to proceed to the second or third
paragraph of a story to insure that the correct factual
content was aunaaarised in Table 1. Furthermore, if a cor-
respondent's lead paragraph was a general reference to
court activities which obviously included the factual
specific content of other lead stories of the same date*
this was considered to be sufficient evidence to state that
the reporter participated in a consensus lead item. For
instance, a general reference by a correspondent to signif-
icant testimony about the Pueblo's ability and performance
in destroying secret documents on the day of capture was
considered to be the same as a specific reference in another
lead paragraph to testimony by Captain John H. D. Williams
that the Pueblo had the time and means to destroy all her
secret papers and equipment. 2
The news reports by the Christian Science &q&UQ£
Slews reports of February 3* 1969* by the corre-
spondents in this study exhibited these two treatments of
the consensus lead item* that is* Captain Williams*
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correspondent of a particular day's testimony always
appeared two days after the event* while AP end UPI stories
occasionally appeared on the sane day as the event or
testimony reported, depending upon the newspaper frost Which
the reports were extracted. In each case* however* the
author categorised these reports as if they had appeared
together on the day following the court proceedings in
question. Mo confusion resulted since the author was able
to identify the report by its content as having referred to
a particular court day. For the same reason* the timeliness
of a report was not considered as a factor of majority or
minority emphasis.
Mews reports in Which a correspondent participated
in a consensus lead are indicated in Table 1 by a plus
sign. Those stories in which a reporter did not use a
consensus lead are indicated by a minus sign. When a corre-
spondent's report did not appear in his publication on a
given day* or the author was unable to find a report by a
correspondent* that day is indicated by a zero.
The percentage of minority emphasis* or the per-
centage of non-participation in consensus leads by each
correspondent, is shown in Table 2. It was determined that
the difference in numbers of news stories written by each
correspondent (shown as totals in Table 1) did not affect
the ranking of errora shown as percentages in Table 2.
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Scripts-iioward 21 • 36.4%
Christian Science
Monitor 21 5 22.8
San fiie<jc Union 21 18.2
Los Angeles Tisies 22 9.1
Associated Press 22 4.5
Maw York Tiaes 23 4.5
Washington Post 21 4.5
United Press
International 22 00.0






As can be muii in Tables 1 end 2* the nine
correspondents who were included in the measurement of
emphasis wrote a total of 173 stories on the selected news
days in which a consensus appeared. Of this total* only 22
stories failed to share the consensus* for a final figure
of 13 p^t cent minority emphasis.
Correspondent a' Bflcfcgraurtia
One of the purposes of this study was to determine
if sny relationship could be established between a corre-
spondent's previous military experience* in the armed
services or as a reporter* and the manner in which he
reported the court of inquiry. The questionnaire shown in
Appendix A was sent to the correspondents in this study and
provided the background information necessary for the
author to make some observations.
Kip Cooper had more previous military experience
than any other correspondent in this study. Cooper mmtv^A
in the Savy from 1939 to 1962* retiring as a chief petty
officer. During his military career* ha performed duties
as a journalist and a public affairs specialist. Consistent
with those duties , Cooper was a military reporter in two
courts of inquiry and about a dosen courts-martial prior to
the Pueblo hearing. Following his Naval service* Cooper
was employed by the Copley Mews Service* owner of the &s&
Qiflga ilnifea. Bis duties included chief of Copley's Tokyo
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Bureau from 1962 to 1967, after which ha became the
military affairs editor for the union. Cooper covered the
Pueblo court in this capacity.
Cooper also offered these additional comments to
the authors
. . . I felt that Jim Lucas • . and myself had
another advantage over other correspondents /at the
Pueblo hearing/? we had all served in Korea during the
war and after had an intimate Knowledge of . . . the
sea waters and the people and their customs. ... I
had exclusive interviews with every 0. S. ambassador
and Avery United Nations commander in Korea between
1962 and 1967. ... I covered a number of the meetings
at Parosunjom and was present when the Reds released two
American aviators. When the Pueblo was captured, X was
the only correspondent—to my knowledge—who wrote that
the men would not be released until the U. ••
apologised • • • not because X consider myself wise or
siaert. but because X was present when thai precedent was
set. X think combinations of all /these/ things ... • •
made me believe that many reporters /at the court/ did
not have a good overall picture of the situation—and
were not doing their homework to find out. 3
Robert Crabbe of the l»X had only minimal previous
military service , from 1943 to 1946, as a radio technician
in the aavy. However, he noted, "Navy service including 14
months sea duty helped /jm/ in understanding terminology.
regard to previous experience in reporting military
affairs, Crabbe stated that he had done so occasionally as
assistant overnight editor for UPI in hom Angeles. While
3Letter to the author dated November 29, 1970.
4Letter to the author dated November 29* 1970.
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he believed thet previous military experience was valuable
in reporting a story like the Pueblo inquiry* Crabbe was
quick to add that in such a long story even an inexperi-
enced reporter could gain the necessary background in
military terminology* command structure and current
affairs. *. . . if he worked hard at it."* Mr. Crabby also
noted* however, that he believed he was assigned by his
superiors to report the fuublc story because "X had a back*
grounu ot work in the Far Bast, including three years in
the Tokyo bureau fro© 1961 to 1964 • • . /jam/ 1 was a Savy
veteran, which my superiors felt would be useful background.'
Be also added the significant comment. ". . . it was cheaper
to send a man from Los Angeles than to fly a specialist out
from Hew York or Washington.*
Karl nesting, in response to th* questionnaire,
noted that as a Navy cook from 1944 to 1945 he received
"... minimal legal and reportorial training in the
kitchen. * Therefore, he did not believe that previous
military service was an advantage to him in reporting the
Fuablo court. Furthermore, in response to the question
concerning the effect of prior military service on any
reporter at the court. Fleming stated. *If a reporter were
a professional military person, it might prejudice him in
S&JL&.
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favor of th9 military but that probably would be rare.




-jzapsi what was lacking in some instances
—at the trial /ttioA X thought, was reporting that
embraced the intricate social and moral questions
involved* and not necessarily the strictly military
ones. It was a subtle story that needed sophisticated
reporting. X thought most of the reporters were .Tajey
and negligent—that they didn't inquire further into
the story than beyond the courtroom. 7
Jack Pox had no previous military experience , and
agreed with Karl Fleming that a reporter's previous mili-
tary service would have had no effect upon his reporting of
the Pueblo court. However, Fox amplified his answer by
adding, "At the outset of the hearing there might be sons
slight help on understanding technicalities but they can be
quickly grasped. 1* However, he added, "When you report and
write for the general public you are just as well off not
a
being an expert."
Fox also stated that he had occasionally reported
military matters in his 28 years as a roving correspondent
for UPX. Among these, he wrote, were the U. S. Marine
landing in Lebanon and the U. 6. intervention in the Domin-
ican Republic. With regard to previous experience in
reporting military affairs. Fox thought it might be of some
6Letter to the author dated Koveraber 17. 1970.
7
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use at the outset of ft military story* but stated that the
element of bias had entered into some stories about the
Pueblo court he had read which were written by military-
experienced reporters at the inquiry. He also added
t
X think it is apparent to anyone who followed the
Pueblo incident closely that it got far beyond the
military area and became a highly emotional issue and
most certainly a political one as manifested by the
court recommending court martial and the Secretary of
the navy overruling the court. This is not to say that
a background in military affairs was not of very
substantial value in covering such a story. But I
would say that a reporter with excellent military
indoctrination but very little exposure to the coverage
of all sorts of affairs outside that arena would have
been hard pressed to do an adequate job on ths Pueblo
affair--at least if he were writing for the general
public. 9
Curtis Sitomer had no previous military service and
no military reporting experience. He responded to the
questionnaire by stating that a correspondent's prior
military service had no effect* in his estimation* on the
way in which he reported the court. Moreover* he stated*
without prior service a reporter could operate with "no
preconceptions or second guesses not based upon the
reporter's own investigations." With regard to having
prior military reporting experience* Mr. Sitomer believed
that it would be advantageous if it included "some back-
ground on procedures of /th*/ court and military judicial
*lbi£.
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system. . • . " In otter general comments, he added t
Perhaps the greatest difficulty I had was not so much a
lack of military background but the feeling that the
real Pueblo story was not surfaced during the Court of
Inquixy. Of course at the time I didn't write rov
suspicions but reported what actually happened.1*
Mr. fcitomer did not elaborate on what he believed
was the story that did not surface during the inquiry.
Wayne Themis* the aviation editor for the chicago
a££Lu&*« believed that prior military service proxaoted
"better understanding of /tha/ atmosphere in which the
Pueblo operated. " Themis* military expedience was as a
tfavy pilot during world War IX and during the Korean
crisis. Us also believed that previous experience in
reporting military affairs would serve to familiarise a
correspondent with the atmosphere of the court in the sane
way as military service.
Tim Tyler « with only mix months active military
service in the Army national Guard* nevertheless believed
that his military experience promoted an understanding of
the duties of command and the aspects of obedience and
loyalty which were portrayed during the Pueblo court. On
the other hand, Tyler did not believe that previous mili-
tary-reporting experience gave a correspondent any















It w«s essentially a story about human beings in time
of crisis; constant coverage ox' military affairs can
only dull a reporter to the human side and make him
overly aware of unimportant matters of military
procedure. 14
Bernard weinraub had two years of experience in the
Army as s Specialist 4, one year of which was in a
divisional public information office in Korea. Be believed
his service from 1959 to 1961 enabled him to understand the
basic rules of chain of command* promotion* the ''hierarch-
ical set up," and enlisted men's and officers* life. 15
Furthermore, Weinraub was of the opinion that, without
military training or service, reporting the Pueblo court
probably would prove confusing, and certainly would take a
little longer for a reporter to understand. Added to his
military service, Weinraub also served as a JfcK XSKk XiJBmA
Vietnam staff writer during 1967 and 1968, and while he
considered this helpful for a reporter, he also cautioned
t
Of course a good reporter would do a good job on the
Pueblo story whether or not he had military experience.
And there were some bad reporters covering the court
who had military experience.
George Wilson spent the years 1945 to 1947 in navy
flight training as an aviation cadet which he stated gave
him •some feeling for the aavy.* Furthermore* he
I4Letter to the author dated November 19, 1970.
15Letter to the author dated December 6* 1970.
16Letter to the author dated December 24* 1970.
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believed that prior military service was an advantage for
any correspondent at the court since "familiarity with the
service and how a ship works cannot be anything but
helpful." As a military correspondent for the £&£.
dating from 1966, Wilson stated he "frequently* reported
military affairs* and in general believed such previous
experience provided s reporter with an advantage at the
court by giving him some familiarity with the subject and
issues.
The author was unsuccessful in soliciting responses
from Julian Hartt and Richard Meyer. However, comments by
their colleagues at the court, coupled with the author's
frequent association with them during the proceedings,
provided some information regarding their background.
It can safely be said of Julian Hartt that he
frequently reported military stories for the Loa *ng*t^e
Tlmas and that he was considered by his contemporaries,
both military and civilian, to hav© had significant experi~
ence with military affairs. The author was unaware of any
previous military service which Mr. Hartt may have had.
Richard meyar was not considered by his contempor-
aries, military or civilian, to have had any significant
experience either as a member of the military or as a
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Jim Lucas established an unimpeachable record as a
military writer during the 37 years of his career as a
journalist. He served as a ccsibat correspondent in the
u. fi. Marine Corps throughout the Western Pacific theater
during World War IZ and wrote two books about his e»qp**ri-
ences these, lie covered Vietnam thoroughly in the mid**
1960s and wrote fcatft I ins"Vifttnaa. . in addition to reporting
the conflict extensively for berippa-Howard.
• •» moon rtdBiMeq/rMu n* ow*»*X<te*«» •»«**
CHAPTER VI
This study of press performance critically analysed
s total of 333 newspaper stories and magazine articles
dealing with the open court proceedings of the US£ Pueblo
Court of Inquiry held at the Naval Amphibious Base.
Coronado. California. In the analysis* seven categories of
error were specified as follows i omission of court proce-
dure or testimony essential to understanding of an event
;
reporter interpretation or analysis of proceedings
unsupported by court event or dialog; misquotation;
incorrect identification of witness; incorrect attribution
of testimony or court officials* statements; inaccurate
headline; misplaced emphasis. Within these categories . 181
significant deviations from the Court Eacocd. were revealed
and discussed by the author as correspondent error. There
were, therefore. .54 errors per story. Of all the reports*
142 of them were completely accurate, yielding a percentage
of 57 per cent.
It should be noted that 12 errors of omission by the
correspondent and 10 errors of omission by the
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These were excluded because it was believed no accurate
comparison could be made between the rate of omissions in
the total content of daily-appearing newspaper stories and
the much sowliar content of a weekly raagaaine article.
Furthermore , of nine issues of 2&3UK&&& appearing during or
immediately after the proceedings only five contained
Pueblo articles, and of nine issues of Xiroa only four
included articles on the Pueblo court of inquiry* Addi-
tionally, as has been discussed* the magazine articles were
excluded frees the measurement of emphasis. However* the
news magasine correspondents were held accountable for all
other categories of error since it was believed these would
not have been affected by the inherent restrictions of
content level already discussed.
In his study of newspaper accuracy. Professor
Blankeriburg compared the quantitative results of four
surveys. While the methodology in these previous studies
is not strictly comparable to the methodology used in this
study, a comparison is included in Table 3 along with the
results of this study.
Zt should be noted, with regard to the errors per
story listed in the first four surveys in Table 3. that the
inclusion of typographic and spelling errors significantly
added to the error rate. This is especially true in the
case of the Blankenburg survey which showed a high
percentage of typographic and spelling errors (see Table 4)
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Blanfcenburg also ranked errors according to the
categories isolated in his and Berry's study* These are
shown in Table 4*
iTABLE 4
BRROR RANKS IN TWO HEWBPAPER ACCURACY SURVEYS*








Typographic and spelling 12.9 34.5
Inaccurate headline 12.9 7.7
Overeaphasis 10.2 e.7
Underuscphasis 10.2 8.5
Name wrong 7.0 3.6
Figures wrong 5.6 5.1
Title wrong 3.1 2.3
Age wrong 2.2 .$
Address wrong 2.2 1.0
Location wrong 2.2 2.1
Tiaes wrong 1.7 2.3
Dates wrong 1.7 1.3
ioo. cm 100. 0?5
*B1ankenburg , JLflC.. ci&.
Although an accurate comparison is difficult to
draw, this study also ranked errors according to the cate-
gories of error used in the analysis. These are shown in
Table 5.
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TABLE 5
(SHU*!* AS FK&CBKI'Aa&S OF TOTAL EWK>RS *OU»i>)
Backer
Yyp* of -rror {181 errors)
Omission 67%
Incorrect interpretation or analysis 13
Misquotation 11




The category of misplaced emphasis could not be
included in Table S since it was a separate measurement
using only 173 out of 333 newspaper stories in the study.
As was noted earlier* that measurement yielded 22 non-
consensus stories* for a 13 per cent total factor of
minority emphasis.
It can be noted from a comparison of error ranks in
Tables 4 and 5 that correspondents' omissions ranked much
higher in this study than in the two previous accuracy
studies. However* all three studies indicated that omis-
sions were one of the uost significant categories of error
in terms of quantity. This study also showed a ranking for
misquotations similar to that in the Kerry and Blaakenburg
studies.




idtoMMMMMi mmmM i •» M Mail I aiM «i b*W^« ;
.*!**• *rfJ el HIM *•<#«*«• Ctt *o **© CVA !•»
-tic* tt b**>X*tY nmiMniir-- J»rf* %a»<U*ft* teJMi a»w «A
,,-a g*dCa*i wtoi****** 's^&oWiW) ***** C 6rt* fr •oKtoT
.-.-.,
......
... i ,,^ j •, ,n. II* ******* *m**a9*
,
.,. : ,- i .. us -. .- • MM itfc *< * : ** ' ••-•'•--•
i45
This study draw together the separate categories of
wrong nart.es. titles* ages, and addresses used in the two
previous studies into the single category-—misidenti fieation
of witness. *sa was noted in the introductory chapter, too
few errors appeared in these categories of identification
to be significant when isolated separately. This is sub-
stantiated by the relatively low factor of 7 per cent for
the error category of misidentification shown in Table 5.
It is obvious that the category of incorrect
interpretation or analysis used in this study does not
compare with any of the error categories isolated in the
Berry and Blanfcenburg studies.
With regard to the categories of wrong figures,
dates and locations, this study tended to list any such
errors under the heading of misquotation since such infor-
mation was revealed to the correspondents at the court
through testimony, court statements, or documents intro-
duced into evidence.
Zt is suspected that the high percentage of
omissions shown in Table 5, as compared to the much lower
percentages found by Berry and Biankenburg and shown in
Table 4, was due to the fact that this study did not specif-
ically include a category of enderemphasis. Thus, some of
this researcher's negative mentions of omission may have
included errors in the grey area between omissions and
underemphasised elements in a story, while the Berry and
mm* Mftia mfctfaJMUPBtai *« piitMil ' -
*n»o3 to im*****j*****m *°* °
, v-.;it;v\ v z-1 ik ****}
^ggj ** .i«M ***** ********
ho» vm« •** *l**» .¥*©*« * ai
14*
Blankenburg studies probably could more oistinctly separate
an omitted item from an underen^hasiced item.
Thia study also sought to compare the performance
of the correspondents based upon th«ir respective military-
reporting experience and previous military service. Xn
order to facilitate that comparison. Table 6 illustrates
the quantity of errors by each correspondent according to
the categories of errors used in this study.
Among the most significant tabulations in Table 6
are the error rates per story shown for each correspondent
in the last column. These, it is believed* are the truest
indication of performance since they take into account the
number of stories which a correspondent actually wrote,
which the percentages of total error do not. Furthermore*
the moot accurate conclusions can be drawn* not from the
actual error rates listed, but from their ranking. Thus,
it can be said that Bernard Weinraub and Robert Crabbe
showed the best performance in terms of this measurement
with only one error for every three stories they wrote
about the Pueblo inquiry. By contrast. Kip Cooper had
errors in one out of every two stories, and Jim Lucas had
errors in about three out of each four stories he wrote.
Furthermore, while one error per story for Karl Fleming is
based on only five stories which he wrote during the court's
proceedings, it can be said that his ranked amongst the
poorest performances by this measurement.
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The primary purpose of this scudy was to test the
hypothesis t Correspondents to the Pueblo Court of Inquiry
accurately reported the open court proceedings in news
stories which appeared in their parent or member publica-
tions.
In terras of the findings of accuracy surveys which
have been conducted by other researchers and listed in
Table 3« the hypothesis is confirmed. Despite the fact
that categories of error and methodology In this study and
in the previous surveys were not strictly comparable* it is
believed that the smaller number of total errors and
smaller error rate found in this analysis support that
conclusion. That finding is no less true if the non-
comparable typographic and spelling errors are excluded
from the total errors found in the earlier surveys. Thus*
for instance, the Blankenburg survey still produced 255
errors and the Berry survey found 359 errors*
However, this conclusion does not discount the
seriousness of the number and quality of errors of amission
committed by the correspondents in their reports of the
court proceedings and testimony* These omissions were
especially noteworthy in the initial stories of January 20
and 21 which introduced the court proceedings to the
reader. It was important that the reader have a compre-








placed by his designation a* a party to the inquiry, even
wore important to the reader* a understanding of the court's
duties was an explanation of the distinct possibility that
Bather would be placed under suspicion when and if his
testimony suggested that he might be incriminating himself.
In retrospect « the Navy's public information effort
to stress that the inquiry was a fact-finding body not
empowered to punish set the mood, both for oarscene public
information officera and the press* which mediated against
any serious consideration of Bucher possibly being placed
under suspicion before it actually happened. Presumably*
the Bevy's legal experts at the court were so well versed
in the inquiry procedures that they were unable to appreci-
ate the inexperienced viewpoint of the members of the pe^mmm
This is illustrated by the fact that neither Captain
Bevsome* nor any other Bavy lawyer attending a press confer-
ence* ever specifically addressed the matter of an official
warning to a court witness. Similarly* the press never
ashed any questions relating to this area. £e a result
*
even though excerpts of the J££k *fty»Kffil explaining this
procedure were distributed to the correspondents* the
importance of their content was not understood.
It is also suggested that errors of omission were
the most serious in terms of the probable damage they did
to the reader's clear understanding of the inquiry taken
as a whole. An error of omission probably never came to a
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reader's attention, or in other words, he ney never have
that a news report left something of importasjoe
By contrast, errors appearing within a news
story at least gave the reader an opportunity to evaluate
and disagree with what the correspondent had written or
interpreted and thereby allowed hist to regard the story
with soma caution.
The seriousness of errors of interpretation or
analysis in Pueblo news stories is not discounted by the
confirmation that the correspondents were statistically ana
cooperatively accurate* This conclusion is supported by
the probable impression created in the mind of the reader
by the several references to Buoher as a mustang and the
obvious attempt by some of the correspondents to suggest an
adversary relationship between the court members and the
Pueblo's commanding officer. There were elements of
conflict in the court and these generally were correctly
and properly reported by the correspondents in the study.
The supposed intrinsic conflict between the admirals and
Buoher on the basis of their respective backgrounds was not
one of the elements, however.
The repeated use of the reference to Buoher as a
mustang by other correspondents in this study after George
Wilson's first use of the term in the opening days of the
inquiry also suggests that the effect of inaccurate
reporting was not restricted just to the reading public.
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The similarity in the comparisons, drawn by different
correspondents, between Bueher and the court members tends
to support this conclusion*
Several general observations can be made to suggest
why a number of the errors committed by the correspondents
did occur* Some correspondents* ss was noted in the
evidence chapters* ssesied to note elements of disagreement
in witnesses* testimony to the exclusion of areas in which
the witnesses agreed with each other* Thus* some reporters
stssnd to place a higher newa value on conflict than on
agreement or harmonious situations* This was apparent in
Julian Hartt*e and Kip Cooper 'a coverage of testimony by
Commander Clark, and their noting that it was in some ways
contradictory to Bueher *s testimony* without mentioning
other significant areas in which the two commanding
officers were in total agreement* At a later point in the
inquiry* it will be recalled* Jim Lucas incorrectly stated
that Lieutenant Harris blamed Bueher for a delay in beginning
the destruction effort. Cooper omitted any mention of the
most specific praise which Pueblo officers gave Bueher when
asked to comment upon his performance by the court. Karl
Fleming incorrectly claimed that the Pueblo's research
detachment waa under the operational control of the National
Security Agency and therefore Bueher could not even enter
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Bach of these arrora seemed to be an attempt,
inadvertent or otherwise* on tha part of the correspondents
to hold reader intereat through tha reporting of conflict*
to make dramatic and interesting that testiiaony which in
actuality was far laaa dramatic and not an indication of
conflict between witnesses. These errors tend to illua-
trate tha newsman's belief that conflict ia taore newsworthy
than peace or harmony.
Tha atudy noted a number of errors committed aa a
reault of a correapondent • s oversimplification of complex
testimony and complex iaauaa before tha court* These,
coupled with an indeterminate number of errors of omission*
can no doubt be attributed to the economy of apace demanded
by the amount of news which must be squeezed into a news-
paper*a neve hole. The economising effort of tha corre-
apondenta to compreaa an entire day of court events into
one or two newa reporta of a length auitable for publica-
tion in their newspapers or magasinee created a real demand
to aelect the overt phases and events of tha day and
blinded them to tha nuances in some of tha testimony and
court procedures.
Similarly* the correspondents' errors in not
correcting the initial testimony by Captain Williams about
tha amount of claasifiad documents aboard the Pueblo is no
doubt an illuatration of the time aqueese upon the corre-




author while ho was at the court , this necessary rush by
the correspondents to meet their deadlines prevented some
on occasion frost attending the daily 5i00 p.m. wrap-up
conference at the CIS during which many of the complex
in the day's testimony were addressed by Captain
», the correspondents in attendance* and court offi-
cials such as Captain Mewsorae* The benefit of these
question-and-answer sessions to the correspondents' fullest
understanding of the day's events was considerable*
Yet, even with these conferences and the benefit of
expert opinions about what the court was doing, it can at
least be hypothesised that all of the correspondents, at
one time or another, were unable to see the reality of the
court events because of the blind spots created by their
own stereotyped images of Bucher as the underdog* of the
court as an adversary proceeding, or generally of the
inhumanity of Navy regulations regarding accountability and
the need to prevent secret material from falling into enemy
hands even at the possible expense of human life* To this
extent, it can be said that some of the correspondents
seemed to be participating in adverse public opinion about
the court's "persecution" of Bucher without regard for
what actually was happening during the open court sessions
Which they attended* Fortunately, many of the correspond-
ents viewed the public reaction to the warning to Bucher,
as evidenced by letters, telephone calls and telegrams to
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the court and CIS* with some alarm. This tended to make
then sore conscioua of the always-prtssant efforts of the
court members to allow Butcher to tell his story in a rela-
tively uninterrupted manner* and to put witnesses before
the court at ease. Thus, before the warning to Bucher and
the public reaction, the correspondents generally made
little reference to these indications of the court's
tolerance and understanding. However, after the public
outcry, and especially during the chilling testimony about
the brutality and torture inflicted upon the men, corre-
spondents* reports frequently mentioned the court members*
compassionate gestures.
The factors which are thought to have contributed
to a greater degree of accuracy in this study than in
previous newspaper accuracy surveys are several. Perhaps
the most obvious factor is that a number of prestige
publications were included in this study* Therefore, it
can be presumed that their news gathering processes were of
high quality especially in terms of the professional abil-
ities of the correspondents at the court who represented
the publications. Furthermore, the nature of the Pueblo
story, a news event of worldwide importance, probably
brought out the best of the abilities of the journalists.
Certainly it can be said that their attention to the news
events was brought to a peak by the inherent importance
drama of the Pueblo inquiry. Mediating against this
MI
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attention span* however, was the long duration of the court,
end the repetitivenea* of testimony during the capture
phase, nonetheless, the correspondents' accuracy in all
categories tended to improve as they became sore familiar
with the story in later stages of the court hearings. This
tends to support the belief that the reporter who has
specialised training or knowledge in a particular news area
will produce better news reports than a non-specialised
reporter.
Moreover, as has been inferred, the intense efforts
of the CXB to promote the correspondents' fullest under-
standing of the court and its dealings doubtless had a
positive iopact on accuracy. Thus, the correspondents had
the benefit of constant feedback from and personal associa-
tion with the Kavy's public affairs and legal personnel who
had immediate access and knowledge about the complexities
of the Pueblo inquiry.
Based upon the correspondents* backgrounds dis-
cussed in Chapter V, and the total errors and error rates
per story for each correspondent listed in Table e, it is
considered that the answer to the question, "What was the
difference, if any, between reports by correspondents with
military reporting experience and correspondents with no
previous experience? " , is that there was no conclusive
difference. As was noted from their backgrounds, Jim Lucas
and Kip Cooper demonstrated the greatest experience in
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reporting military affairs* yet their respective error
rates of .71 and .53 errors per story exceeded the lower
error rate of .43 demonstrated by Richard Meyer who had no
significant experience in military affairs reporting. On
the other hand, Bernard tleinraub* who had a fair araount of
military reporting experience before the Pueblo inquiry*
demonstrated the lowest error rate* .31* of any of the
correspondents in this study.
It is most difficult to assess the reasons behind
the varying differences demonstrated by the correspondents
in this study when compared to the relatively identifiable
background each had in terms of previous military reporting
experience or previous military service. iterhaps the most
reasonable conclusion which can be drawn was best expressed
by Bernard Weinraub's personal comment to the authors
Of course a good reporter would do a good job on the
Pueblo story whether or not he had military experienom.
And there were some bad reporters /covering the cour&/
who had military experience.
The inference, of course* is that basic training
and professionalism of a journalist are the important
factors in the quality of his reporting, nonetheless* as
Weinraub and a number of the correspondents indicated*
previous military experience was generally considered to be
an advantage in the initial reporting of the court* an
opinion supported by the decreasing nuraber of errors shown
in this study as the reporters became familiar with their
subject. This* it seems* cannot easily be denied so long
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as m bias in favor of the military doaa not distort the
reporter'* viewpoint.
Studies of press performance in th© coverage of
actual news avanta are an important and realistic roethod of
journalistic research* and offor immediate and transfer-
able suggestions for improving news reporting in general*
The problem is in selecting a finite news event Where
sources of information to newsmen can be isolated and* most
importantly* an unimpeachable record of the event can be
found.
There is also an advantage in having a news event
of some complexity and duration to permit the so-called
subjective errors of interpretation, emphasis* and omission
to appear in the press performance in a significant manner.
The Pueblo Court of Inquiry, mm a vehicle to test
press performance, met these conditions in a satisfactory
way. At the same time* other areas for research and
improvements to the Navy's public information effort ware
suggested by this study*
In general* the correspondents Indicated by their
responses to the author that they welcomed the opportunity
to express their ideas about the news gathering effort at
the Pueblo hearing e» These responses predominantly noted
their concern that the "human elements of individuals in
time of crisis* were not covered In most news reports.
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and other additional comments to the questionnaire
used in this study suggest that a thorough investigation,
using a survay technique • of the itqpresslons of the approxi-
mately 30 correspondents who covered the court might be
valuable.
Moreover* this study made no attempt to investigate
the area of the visual and broadcast stadia* Including
these correspondents in a survey might reveal points of
contrast and agreement between their observations and those
rsmen from the print madia*
With regard to the &avy*s public information effort,
definite recommendations are in order* It is evident
from this study that the correspondents were not fully
conversant with the legal procedures the court was applying
when it warned Commander Bucher* The Pueblo QXB should
better have prepared the newsmen for this likelihood, and
should have impressed upon the court counsel and court
members the predictable effects upon the newsmen of the
dramatic interruption of testimony on January 22, 1969, the
court recess while all in attendance at the court waited,
virtually spellbound, wai the resumption of the day's
session with tha otherwise normal advisement to Bucaer that
he was suspected of having violated Kavy regulations*
Instead, it was assumed the press would understand and
therefore no preparations were made to introduce the newamei
to the warning procedure beforehand, and no briefing was
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hiId for thorn after the warning wai given. Thus, tha
public affairs personnel at the court failed to inform tha
court about tha probable irapact of its actions with ragard
to tha press* and failed to plan properly for connunicating
to the newsman the meaning of those actions when they were
taken. These were the fundamental failures of the public
information effort: at the Pueblo inquiry. They derived
from a shortsightedness on the part of public affairs
personnel primarily* but also from the lack of coordination
between the court* its legal advisors* and the CIB. In the
future that coordination* with specific concern for the
lack of knowledge the public and the members of the press
have* must be assured.
Finally, some comments regarding the inherent limita-
tions in the design of this study are in order. Perhaps the
most obvious problem the author encountered in determining
reporter error was in the area of emphasis. Its measurement
by means of consensus lead items penalised those correspond-
ents who might actually have correctly emphasised an item
even though they were in the minority. It is hoped that
later studies can find a more adequate way to deal with
errors in emphasis. Second* later researchers would be wise
to conduct a coder reliability check in order to preclude
the possibility of undue personal bias and to insure
replicatability.
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1. Have you been in the military service? YB8_(go to Q la)
MO (90 to 04)
*• What ware the dates of your «tvjoq?
b. Branch of a»rvlca?
c. What was your highest enlisted rate or commissioned
reek?
d. Mere you a journalist » combat correspondent ,
public affairs specialist • or What were your
duties?
_
2. 80s many formal courts of inquiry did you participate
is? (If none, 90 to Q 3)
a. In what capacity did you partlglpatft?
3. Did ueiav in the military service help you in reporting
the Pueblo court? XSB HO Why?_
,
4. In general, do you think that, if a reporter had prior
military service, it was an advantage___, disadvantage ,
or had no effect upon his reporting of the Pueblo
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court? Why?
5. Were you * military affairs reporter for your publica-
tion whan you covered the Pueblo court? YES (90 to
Q 5a) S0.__ (90 to 06)
a. For how long before the Pueblo court were you a
military affairs reporter for that publication?
6. What waa your job title* if any* at the publication you
worked for when covering the Pueblo aaarti?
7. Have you ever been considered a military affairs
reporter by a publication for which you worked? Y£$_
(90 to Q 7a) K0__ (90 to Q ©)
a. Please list the most recent positions 1








8. As a reporter would you say you have reported military
affaire* MOST OP THE TIXE_, FR3£QU£*irLY__„ ,
OCCASIONALLY
. SELDOM • »EVER__.„,.
9. Do you think a reporter with previous military affairs
experience had an advantage over a reporter without any
such experience in reporting the Pueblo court? YSS_
*>_ Why?
* tov MW%» fMMo ©ici» »* «44 friK**rf f««i wod 7*1
faaUteUdte* *Ml* tot '«jwim «i*SU IP
. .
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10. l>id you ever report a court-martial before you reported
the Pueblo inquiry r TSS How many? sXl„
11. bid you ever report a formal military inquiry before
the Pueblo inquiry? XBS (go to Q 11a) SO (go to
Q 12)
a. Please list the moat recent of theses







12. Z am most grateful for your assistance* and would
appreciate any additional comments you care to make.
I'll be happy to answer any questions you might have*
too. Would you list your current mailing address if
different from the one I have used?
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